

CHAPTER 6

Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination



**RACISM
WRONG**

FOCUS

Questions

1. What purpose does stereotyping serve as a cognitive process for humans?
2. What is modern racism?
3. Why do social scientists contend that sexism has both a hostile side and a benevolent side?
4. Can prejudice be reduced, or is it so ingrained in our species' evolutionary heritage that it is impossible to reduce?

CHAPTER

Outline

Introduction

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How can our schools be positive institutions of social change?

Preview Over the years, prejudice research has examined both the social conditions that support and weaken intergroup intolerance, and the impact that such intolerance has on those who are its targets. How have social psychologists applied this knowledge to promote diversity acceptance and academic achievement in schools?

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Introduction

“Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me,
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!”

This passage from Emma Lazarus’s poem is inscribed on a tablet within the pedestal of the Statue of Liberty that stands on Ellis Island in New York Harbor, greeting immigrants to the United States of America. Despite the welcoming sentiment expressed in this famous poem, immigrants are not always treated fairly when they arrive on this country’s shores. For example, during the 1800s and early 20th century,

Jews and Italian immigrants were perceived as non-Anglo and nonwhite; as such, they experienced extreme prejudice, discrimination, and even violence. Next to African Americans, Italian Americans were the second most likely ethnic group to be lynched during this time period.

Anti-immigrant bias in this country persists in the 21st century, especially toward people from Latin America and those of Arab descent. Prejudice toward immigrants can be fueled by a number of factors, including a fear by Americans that these newcomers will take their jobs, threaten their safety, deplete social welfare services, and destroy the American way of life by refusing to adopt mainstream cultural values and practices.

Hostility toward immigrants is not limited to America’s shores. In 2014, Switzerland passed a controversial anti-immigration law that set strict quotas on immigration. German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared the death of multiculturalism in her country 3 years earlier, stating that

it had been foolhardy to think that Germans and foreign workers could “live happily side-by-side.” Similar anti-immigration sentiments are expressed in other European countries such as Great Britain, France, Austria, Italy, Sweden, Holland, Hungary, and Spain. The factors underlying the anti-immigrant tide in these countries are similar to



Anti-immigrant sentiment is not new to the United States and is fed by the often-false belief that immigrants drain a country’s resources. How do such beliefs lead to prejudice and discrimination? (Shutterstock)

those in America: fear of job loss, fear of crime, fear of social welfare depletion, and fear of national identity loss.

In all these countries, resentment toward immigrants has been strongly fueled by economic problems and unemployment. Yet Dartmouth business professor Vijay Govindarajan (2010) contends that the reasoning underlying the belief that foreign immigrants take jobs from a country's existing citizens is often both flawed and shortsighted. Govindarajan states that many immigrants have skills and capabilities that are unique and not readily available among most current residents of a country. Further, these talented immigrants regularly create innovation that builds new industries and thereby create more jobs in their host countries. For example, in the United States, Govindarajan notes that the founders or cofounders of the following recently created high-tech companies were all recent immigrants: Google, Sun Microsystems, eBay, Juniper Networks, YouTube, Yahoo!, and Intel. These new companies—in which highly skilled immigrants played a lead role—have generated hundreds of thousands of new jobs for Americans. Despite evidence that immigrants can strengthen and help to rejuvenate their host countries, hostility toward these people persists; for many citizens in countries around the world, immigrants are “those people” who threaten “us” and “our way of life.”

In this chapter, we examine the social psychology of intergroup bias and intolerance—including the type of prejudice and discrimination experienced by immigrants around the world—as well as intergroup intolerance based on other social identities. We also analyze the many social, cognitive, and developmental causes of prejudice and discrimination, and the consequences that bias and intolerance have for those who are targeted. Finally, we explore research and theory concerning possible remedies.

The three most important social psychological terms associated with the bias and conflict that occur between members of different social groups are *stereotyping*, *prejudice*, and *discrimination*. These three terms are closely tied yet still distinct. Very few of us view these terms positively, but they are a part of all human cultures. We generally go to great lengths to avoid being accused of stereotyping, being prejudiced, or discriminating against others; and most of us realize that being the target of prejudice and discrimination is almost never a good thing. Yet what is prejudice? How is prejudice different from discrimination? Is stereotyping sometimes a good thing, or is it always wrong? Can you be prejudiced without knowing it? What causes prejudice, both at the intergroup level and at the interpersonal level? Can you fix a prejudiced mind? These and other important questions will be addressed in this chapter.



When you think of a recent immigrant to this country what is the most typical image that comes to mind for you? Mexican migrant workers and Chinese high-tech entrepreneurs often elicit very different stereotypes among Americans, but both immigrant groups are targets of prejudice and discrimination.
(Wikimedia Commons, iStock)

6.1 WHAT ARE THE COMPONENTS OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT?

Chapter 5 examined how attitudes and beliefs are related to behavior. In this chapter we examine how some specific types of attitudes and beliefs about members of other social

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groups are related to specific types of antisocial behavior. On the most basic level, stereotypes involve beliefs about specific groups; prejudice involves attitudes toward those groups; and discrimination involves actions toward those groups. Thus, in understanding intergroup conflict and intolerance, stereotyping is the cognitive component, prejudice is the affective component, and discrimination is the behavioral component.

6.1a Stereotypes Are Beliefs About Social Groups.

As you recall from Chapter 4 (pp. 113–114), we naturally and automatically develop social categories based on people’s shared characteristics. Once categorized, we begin to perceive people differently. Often the nature of these different perceptions is determined by whether the individuals are ingroup members or outgroup members (Deaux, 1996). An **ingroup** is a group to which we belong and that forms a part of our social identity, while an **outgroup** is any group with which we do not share membership.

Outgroup Homogeneity Effect

How many times have you heard a woman say, “Well, you know men ... They’re all alike and they all want the same thing!”? Likewise, how often have you heard men describing women in similar terms? This tendency—seeing members within a given outgroup as being more alike than members of one’s ingroup—is found in children as well as in adults (Guinote et al., 2007). Research has shown that merely assigning people to different social groups can create this **outgroup homogeneity effect**, but it is stronger when directed toward well-established groups (Boldry et al., 2007). Bernadette Park and Charles Judd found that on college campuses, sorority members, business majors, and engineering students all tended to perceive students in other campus social groups (those in other sororities or those with other majors) as more alike than those in their ingroup (Judd et al., 1991; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Perhaps you have witnessed some of your own college professors making homogeneous assumptions about certain minority groups by asking minority students in their classrooms to represent their group’s attitudes and beliefs. Do you think those students—perhaps you were one of those students—might have felt uncomfortable and even stigmatized by being singled out?

Brain-imaging studies indicate that this tendency to notice differences among ingroup members while perceiving outgroup members as being more alike is due to the fact that we engage in less thorough neural processing when attending to outgroup members (Ambady & Adams, 2011; Van Bavel & Cunningham, 2012). In other words, we invest less cognitive effort when attending to outgroup members compared to ingroup members, relying more on group-based stereotypes when making social judgments (Amodio, 2011).

Although we tend to perceive outgroups as being fairly uniform, our view of ingroup members is generally that they are relatively *distinct* and *complex*. For example, young adults tend to perceive others of their age as having more complex personalities than the elderly, whereas older adults hold exactly opposite beliefs (Brewer & Lui, 1984). Interestingly, the outgroup homogeneity effect actually reverses and becomes an “ingroup homogeneity effect” when members of *small groups* or *minority groups* compare their own group with the majority outgroup on attributes central to their social identity (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998). This reversal is especially likely to occur when the ingroup members strongly identify with one another (Simon et al., 1995). In such instances, by emphasizing their similarities with fellow ingroup members, minority group members affirm their social identity and perceive themselves as a unified, similar group in comparison to the larger and seemingly more diverse comparison group.

ingroup

A group to which we belong and that forms a part of our social identity

outgroup

Any group with which we do not share membership

outgroup homogeneity effect

Perception of outgroup members as being more similar to one another than are members of one’s ingroup

Our tendency to perceive outgroup members as similar to one another sets the stage for developing beliefs about their personalities, abilities, and motives. These social beliefs, which are typically learned from others and maintained through regular social interaction, are **stereotypes** (Quadflieg & Macrae, 2011). Stereotypes are a type of *schema*, which is an organized structure of knowledge about a stimulus that is built up from experience and contains causal relations; it is a theory about how the social world operates (see Chapter 4, pp. 114–116 for a review).

As with other areas of social thinking, stereotyping can involve both deliberate and automatic cognitive processing (Wegener et al., 2006). Like other types of schemas, stereotypes significantly influence how we process and interpret social information—even when we are not consciously aware that they have been activated from memory (Kiefer & Sekaquaptewa, 2007). When activated in this manner, stereotypes can nonconsciously influence our thoughts and actions. These *implicit stereotypes* can be activated by various stimuli. Once a stereotype is activated, we tend to see people within that social category as possessing the traits or characteristics associated with the stereotyped group.

The Purpose of Stereotyping

In studying stereotyping, social psychologists have pondered what purpose it serves as a cognitive process. As previously discussed in Chapter 4 (p. 116), the quickness of stereotyped thinking is one of its most apparent qualities: Being *fast*, it gives us a basis for immediate action in uncertain circumstances. In a very real sense, stereotypes are “shortcuts to thinking” that provide us with rich and distinctive information about individuals we do not personally know. Not only do stereotypes provide us with a fast basis for social judgments, but stereotyping also appears to “free up” cognition for other tasks (Macrae et al., 1994). Thus, a second function of stereotyped thinking is that it is *efficient* and allows people to cognitively engage in other necessary activities. Daniel Gilbert (1989) suggests that this resource-preserving effect has an evolutionary basis. That is, expending cognitive resources as cheaply as possible enables perceivers to redirect their energy to more pressing concerns. The speed and efficiency of stereotype-based information apparently motivates people to rely on it over the more time-consuming method of getting to know a person as an individual.

One of the important reasons the activation of stereotypes often results in fast social judgments is that filtering social perceptions through a stereotype causes people to ignore information that is relevant but inconsistent with the stereotype (Dijksterhuis & Knippenberg, 1996). For example, Harriet might believe that Jews are more deceptive in their business dealings than non-Jews. When asked why she holds this belief, Harriet might recall a set of pertinent cases of either business deception or honesty from her own personal experiences or from the experiences of others. In recalling these instances, Harriet remembers those few cases that conform to her stereotype of Jews, but she forgets or explains away all those that clash with it. Based on this selective recall of past cases, Harriet concludes that there is an association between Jews and deception, even though the correlation is no greater than it is for non-Jews. This example illustrates the power of an **illusory correlation**, which is the belief that two variables are associated with each other when no actual association exists.

At least two factors can produce an illusory correlation. The first is *associative meaning*, in which two variables are associated with each other because of the perceiver’s preexisting beliefs. Because Harriet expects Jews to be more deceptive, she is not only more likely to notice possible instances of deception in her business dealings with Jews (compared with non-Jews), but she is also more likely to interpret ambiguous

“Labels are devices for saving talkative persons the trouble of thinking.”

—John Morley, English statesman and author, 1838–1923

stereotypes

Beliefs about the personalities, abilities, and motives of a social group that don’t allow for individual variation

illusory correlation

The belief that two variables are associated with each other when in fact there is little or no actual association

actions by Jews as reflecting sinister intentions. Numerous studies have found that people's preexisting attitudes and beliefs can predispose them to perceive associations that are truly illusory (Berndsen et al., 2002). Once the stereotype is activated, the person engages in biased processing of social information by attending to information consistent with the stereotype and ignoring contradictory information.

A second factor contributing to the development of illusory correlations is *shared distinctiveness*, in which two variables are associated because they share some unusual feature. According to this view, Harriet might have developed an illusory correlation about Jews and dishonesty because both the minority group and the unfavorable trait are "infrequent" or "distinct" variables in the population. These two distinct variables are more likely associated in Harriet's memory simply because of their shared distinctiveness.

In an experiment demonstrating this effect, David Hamilton and Robert Gifford (1976) asked participants to read information about people from two different groups, "Group A" and "Group B." Twice as much information was provided about Group A, making Group B the smaller or "minority group" in the study. In addition, twice as much of the information given about both groups involved desirable behaviors rather than undesirable actions. Desirable information included statements such as, "John, a member of Group A, visited a sick friend in the hospital." An example of an undesirable statement was, "Bob, a member of Group B, dropped litter in the subway station." Even though there was no correlation between group membership and the proportion of positive and negative information, participants perceived a correlation.


As Figure 6.1 shows, participants overestimated the frequency with which Group B, the "minority group," behaved undesirably. In this study, the members of the "minority group" (who were described only half as much as the "majority group") and the undesirable actions (which occurred only half as often as the desirable behaviors) were both distinctive. This shared distinctiveness resulted in their illusory correlation, a finding replicated in later studies (Mullen & Johnson, 1995). Together, these studies indicate that although stereotyping may be beneficial because it allows us to redirect our energies to other pressing cognitive activities, the cost appears to be that we run the risk of making faulty social judgments about whomever we stereotype. Such biased information-processing often occurs unconsciously (Payne et al., 2004).

Stereotype Content and Intergroup Relations

Although research has traditionally focused on the inaccuracy of stereotypes, Lee Jussim and his coworkers (2009a) contend that their review of studies examining stereotype accuracy strongly suggests that it is false to characterize stereotypes as inherently inaccurate.

The truth is that stereotypes can lead to accurate social judgments (Ashton & Esses, 1999). However, because stereotypes develop in a social environment in which groups are regularly interacting with one another, each group's beliefs about the other are shaped and distorted by the interaction. For example, the negative stereotypes that African Americans and white Americans have about each other have been shaped by the history of their intergroup relations and the resulting mutually shared feelings of threat (Stephan et al., 2002). While many African Americans perceive white Americans as powerful, dominating, threatening, and intentionally oppressive, many white Americans perceive African Americans as irrational, hostile, destructive, and out of control (Alexander et al., 2005). These findings illustrate how stereotypes often reveal a good deal more about the nature of the relationship between groups than they reveal about the groups themselves.


THINKING

CRITICAL 

Media commentators in the United States often use the terms "red" and "blue" to refer to perceived cultural differences in America and American politics. Why might the increased use of these terms increase prejudice and conflict between political groups in America?

Figure 6.1 Illusory Correlations and the Persistence of Stereotypes

In Hamilton and Gifford's (1976) study of illusory correlations, participants read sentences in which a person from Group A or Group B was associated with either a desirable or an undesirable behavior. Both groups were described with the same proportion of desirable and undesirable behaviors, but only half of the provided information was about Group B members, making them the "minority group." Participants later overestimated the number of undesirable behaviors in the minority group (Group B), suggesting that people tend to perceive an illusory correlation between variables that stand out because they are unusual or deviant.



As we will discuss in more detail later (pp. 220–222), within a society the stereotypes that are commonly held about a particular group of people are shaped by the group's social status (low or high) and whether it is perceived to have a competitive or cooperative relationship with mainstream society. Doctors, for example, are generally perceived as a high-status, cooperative group because they possess valuable skills that are used to maintain and improve the lives of other people in society. As a result, most people view them with respect and even admiration, and doctors are often stereotyped as being intelligent, hardworking, and caring, although perhaps sometimes arrogant. In contrast, high-status groups that are perceived as having a competitive relationship with many mainstream groups within society are stereotyped as being highly competent but also as having sinister or selfish motives. The stereotype of Jews being clever, good with money, but devious in their financial dealings with other members of society is an example of this envy-based stereotyping. Recent immigrants from such countries as India and China are similarly labeled with envy-based stereotypes.



Within our society there are many different positive and negative stereotypes associated with various groups. Doctors, for example, are favorably perceived as a high-status, cooperative group. (iStock)

Stereotypes surrounding low-status groups often have an air of condescension, but they can include positive qualities for groups that are perceived as offering benefits to mainstream society. For example, sexist men might view women as being nurturing and “pure of heart” but inherently weak and incompetent, while sexist women might think of men as being likable and fun-loving but hopelessly immature and irresponsible. In contrast to this mixture of positive and negative stereotype content, stereotypes of low-status groups who are perceived as taking valuable resources from mainstream society are almost exclusively negative—such as the characteristics associated with homeless people, welfare recipients, obese individuals, and low-skilled immigrants. The negative stereotypes directed toward low-skilled immigrants—including those who are illegal immigrants—are largely shaped by perceptions that this particular social group is taking jobs from American citizens, draining the resources of social welfare agencies, and threatening the national identity of the United States with its cultural practices (Huntington, 2004).

6.1b Prejudice Is an Attitude and Discrimination Is an Action.

The type of shared social beliefs that some Americans have toward immigrants can create a psychological climate that leads to prejudice and discrimination (Jackson, 2011). Yet

“The whole world is festering with unhappy souls: The French hate the Germans, the Germans hate the Poles; Italians hate Yugoslavs, South Africans hate the Dutch; And I don’t like anybody very much!”

— Sheldon Harnick, American songwriter, born 1924
from *The Merry Little Minuet*.

what is prejudice, and how is it different from discrimination? The traditional definition of prejudice is that it is a *negative* attitude toward members of a specific group. This conventional view assumes that prejudice can be represented as a simple continuum of one emotion that varies in intensity from mild dislike to burning hatred. However, many forms of prejudice involve complex and contradictory emotions, combining negative attitudes toward group members on some dimensions with positive attitudes on other dimensions. As an example, consider the following hypothetical statement made by a man about women:

I adore women. I love the way they look, the way they cook. I put women on a pedestal and worship them. But if a woman begins thinking she can “lord it over” a man, then she’s a problem and is no good for anything.

Is this statement an expression of prejudice? Using the traditional definition as a guide, we would probably conclude that the first three sentences don’t conform to the definition of prejudice, but the last sentence does. However, an increasing number of social scientists contend that it is misleading and overly simplistic to define prejudice solely in terms of varying degrees of dislike. These critics of the traditional definition would argue that underlying the first three sentences’ seemingly positive evaluations is an underlying judgment that women are somehow undeserving of having a social status equal to men.

Due to these concerns with the traditional definition, in this chapter **prejudice** is defined as attitudes toward members of specific groups that directly or indirectly suggest they deserve an inferior social status (Glick & Hilt, 2000). This definition has the advantage of being able to account for seemingly positive attitudes that prejudiced individuals often express toward other social groups that simultaneously justify placing these groups into a lower social status. By allowing for the possibility of both positive and negative evaluations, this definition includes prejudices that are sometimes described as “ambivalent.” This definition can also account for “upward-directed” prejudices, meaning prejudice expressed by members of lower-status groups toward groups that have higher status but are seen as undeserving of their higher rank. The prejudice expressed by

prejudice

Attitudes toward members of specific groups that directly or indirectly suggest they deserve an inferior social status

some members of minority groups, some women's prejudice toward men, and some working-class resentment and envy of the upper social classes—all are examples of this upward-directed prejudice.

Beyond recognizing prejudice in others, is it possible to harbor prejudice toward another group without being aware of it? The overwhelming scientific opinion is that it is indeed possible (Amodio et al., 2004a; Levy & Banaji, 2002). In other words, prejudice can be either explicit or implicit. **Explicit prejudice** involves consciously held prejudicial attitudes toward a group, while **implicit prejudice** involves unconsciously held prejudicial attitudes. This perspective on prejudice mirrors similar developments in attitude research in general (see Chapter 5, pp. 162–164). People with low explicit prejudice but high implicit prejudice toward a particular outgroup may not be aware of their negative bias. Therefore, while responding in negative ways toward members of outgroups, these low explicit/high implicit prejudice individuals might honestly believe that they are nonprejudiced. In general, research suggests that implicit prejudice is more stable, enduring, and difficult to change than explicit prejudice (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001).

Despite the hidden nature of implicit prejudice, scientists study it using various techniques, including the Implicit Association Test and brain-imaging technology (see Chapter 2, p. 61). Researchers often employ both techniques in one study: using the Implicit Association Test to identify white individuals with high implicit racial prejudice and then using functional magnetic resonance imaging to scan their brains while they look at photos of familiar and unfamiliar black and white faces (Amodio & Lieberman, 2009). As depicted in Figure 6.2, these studies find that the unfamiliar black faces are

explicit prejudice


Prejudicial attitudes that are consciously held, even if they are not publicly expressed

implicit prejudice

Unconsciously held prejudicial attitudes

Figure 6.2 Measuring Implicit Prejudice Using Brain Scans

When white participants with high scores on an implicit measure of racial prejudice (but low explicit prejudice scores) were shown photos of familiar and unfamiliar black and white faces, the unfamiliar black faces were much more likely than the unfamiliar white faces to activate brain regions associated with arousal and emotional responses and the brain's "alarm" system for threat, pain, and danger (Phelps et al., 2000). What implications does the existence of implicit prejudice have for attempts at reducing intergroup hostility?



Source: "Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation," by Phelps et al., 2000, *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience*, 12, pp. 729–738.

much more likely than the unfamiliar white faces to activate the *amygdala* in both the right and left cerebral hemispheres and the *anterior cingulate* in the frontal lobes. These brain structures are involved in arousal and emotional learning and play a crucial role in detecting threat and triggering fear (Phelps et al., 2000). No heightened amygdala and cingulate activity occurs when these high implicit/low explicit prejudiced participants view familiar black faces. These findings suggest that, despite not consciously reporting any negative racial attitudes toward African Americans, implicitly prejudiced whites perhaps unknowingly experience heightened arousal associated with some level of anxiety and negativity toward blacks. Similar findings have also been obtained from African American students when they viewed photos of white faces (Hart et al., 2000).

In contrast to prejudice, there is relative consensus in social psychology when defining discrimination. For our purposes, we define **discrimination** as a negative and/or patronizing action toward members of specific groups. Disliking, disrespecting, and/or resenting people because of their group membership are examples of prejudice. Physically attacking them or failing to hire them for jobs because of their group membership are examples of discrimination. As we learned in Chapter 5, behavior does not always follow attitude. Similarly, discrimination is not an inevitable result of prejudice. For example, a storeowner who is prejudiced against blacks might not act on this negative attitude because most of his customers are black and he needs their business. In this case, the subjective norm (see Chapter 5, p. 186) dictates against the storeowner acting on his prejudice.

It is also true that discrimination can occur without prejudice. Sometimes people who are not prejudiced still engage in *institutional discrimination* by carrying out the discriminatory guidelines of institutions. For instance, due to new state immigration laws, police officers in Georgia can demand at traffic stops that people of Hispanic descent show documentation of their citizenship while not making similar demands of drivers whose facial features fit the European American prototype. Similarly, real estate agents in large urban settings may show African American clients only houses located in black or racially mixed neighborhoods even though they have no animosity toward African Americans (and may be black themselves). They carry out this institutional practice, known as *redlining*, because they are following the guidelines of their superiors, who believe that integration will lower property values.

6.1c There Are Three Basic Forms of Prejudice.

Consistent with the updated conception of prejudice and our previous discussion of stereotypes, Peter Glick and Susan Fiske (2001) propose that there are three basic forms of prejudice that account for the different ways in which groups are perceived and treated. According to these theorists, which form of prejudice is directed toward a particular group is determined by two social factors.

The first social factor is whether the target group is perceived as having a competitive or cooperative relationship with mainstream society. A group has a *competitive relationship* if they are perceived as intentionally grabbing resources for themselves at the expense of other groups. Examples of competitive groups would be rich and poor people, who are often perceived as unfairly taking or receiving societal resources, respectively. In contrast, a group has a *cooperative relationship* with mainstream society if they are perceived as undemanding (such as self-sufficient elderly people), contributing (such as homemakers raising children), or needing help through no fault of their own (such as the disabled).

The second social factor is whether the target group is of relatively low or high social status within mainstream society. Examples of relatively *low-status* groups in the United States are poor people, women in general, homeless people, working-class people, obese individuals, gay men and lesbians, blacks, Hispanics, Muslims, the disabled, housewives, and the elderly. Examples of relatively *high-status* groups are rich people, men in

discrimination

Negative and/or patronizing action toward members of specific groups

general, whites in general, heterosexuals, middle-class whites, highly educated people, Christians, Jews, Asians, and career women.

As depicted in Table 6.1, if a group has relatively low social status and is perceived as having a competitive relationship with mainstream society, it is likely to become the target of *contemptuous prejudice*, characterized by exclusively negative attitudes of disrespect, resentment, and hostility. Contemptuous prejudice is most people's prototype for prejudice because it is characterized by uniformly negative emotions and attitudes; it most closely fits the traditional definition of prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). The blatant prejudices often expressed toward poor whites, poor blacks, homeless people, obese individuals, welfare recipients, lesbians and gay men, and low-skilled immigrants are examples of contemptuous prejudice.

Table 6.1 Three Forms of Prejudice Based on a Group's Relative Status and Its Relationship with Mainstream Society

Group's Relative Social Status	Group's Relationship with Mainstream Society	
	Cooperative	Competitive
<i>High</i>	<i>No Prejudice</i>	<i>Envious Prejudice</i>
Negative Emotions	None	Envy, fear, resentment, hostility
Positive Emotions	Respect, admiration, affection	Grudging admiration of abilities
Behavior	Defer	Avoid, exclude, segregate, exterminate
Common Targets	Dominant groups perceived as "contributors": middle-class people, white people, Christians, heterosexuals	Jews, Asians, feminists, rich people, female professionals, black professionals
<i>Low</i>	<i>Paternalistic Prejudice</i>	<i>Contemptuous Prejudice</i>
Negative Emotions	Disrespect, condescension	Disrespect, disgust, resentment, hostility
Positive Emotions	Patronizing affection, pity, liking	None
Behavior	Personal intimacy, but role segregation	Avoid, exclude, segregate, exterminate
Common Targets	The elderly, the disabled, traditional women, adolescents and young adults	Poor people, homeless people, obese persons, welfare recipients, Muslims, lesbians and gay men, illegal immigrants

Adapted from "Sacrificial Lambs Dressed in Wolves' Clothing: Envious Prejudice, Ideology, and the Scapegoating of Jews," by P. Glick, 2002, in *Understanding Genocide: The Social Psychology of the Holocaust*, edited by L. S. Newman & R. Erber, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 113–142.

In contrast to this easily recognized intergroup hostility, the other two forms of prejudice each represent a type of *ambivalent prejudice* because they consist of both negative and positive attitudes. For instance, if a high-status group has a competitive relationship with mainstream society, it may become the target of *envious prejudice*, in which feelings of resentment and hostility are mixed with fear and envy, as well as with the positive emotions of respect and admiration. So-called model minorities—such as Jews and Asian Americans—are often targets of envious prejudice (Lin et al., 2005). Similarly, the mixed evaluations of feminists, black professionals, and people in the upper classes of society are often rooted in envious prejudice. When a high-status outgroup is perceived as highly competent and threatening, the resulting envious prejudice can sometimes generate "hot" discrimination, in which the outgroup becomes a convenient target for high levels of frustration-fed aggression (Duckitt, 2001).

Finally, a low-status group that has a cooperative or noncompetitive relationship with mainstream society may become the target of *paternalistic prejudice*. Paternalism is the care or control of subordinates in a manner suggesting a father's relationship with his children. The ambivalent attitudes expressed in this form of prejudice might involve patronizing affection and pity mixed with condescension and disrespect. Sociologist Mary Jackman (1994) refers to paternalistic prejudice as the “velvet glove” approach to dominance, because dominant groups emphasize rewards rather than punishments in maintaining their control over subordinate groups. Although paternalism in intergroup relations often conjures up the 19th century ideology of the “white man's burden,” Jackman contends that it is still an identifiable and influential form of prejudice. The elderly, the disabled, housewives, women in general, and adolescents and young adults are often the targets of paternalistic prejudice.

- The outgroup homogeneity effect is the tendency to perceive people in outgroups as more similar to one another than ingroup members.
- Stereotypes are social beliefs typically learned from others and maintained through regular social interaction.
- Two qualities of stereotyped thinking are that it is fast and efficient, but often faulty.
- Prejudice involves attitudes toward members of specific groups that directly or indirectly suggest that they deserve an inferior social status.
- Explicit prejudices are consciously held, while implicit prejudices are unconsciously held.
- Discrimination is a negative and/or patronizing action toward members of specific groups.
- The form of prejudice directed toward a group is determined by two social factors:
 - whether the target group is perceived as having a competitive or cooperative relationship with mainstream society
 - whether the target group is of low or high social status within mainstream society
- Contemptuous prejudice occurs when the target group has a competitive relationship with mainstream society and has low social status.
- Envious prejudice occurs when the target group has a competitive relationship with mainstream society and has high social status.
- Paternalistic prejudice occurs when the target group has a cooperative relationship with mainstream society and has low social status.

6.2 WHO ARE COMMON TARGETS OF INTOLERANCE?

In all societies, some social groups are valued while other groups are stigmatized. A **stigma** is an attribute that discredits a person or a social group in the eyes of others (Shana & van Laar, 2006; Ullah, 2011). Stigmatized persons are not simply different from others; society also judges their difference to be discrediting. Individual members of society may vary in how they personally respond to a particular stigma, but everyone shares the knowledge that the characteristic in question—the “mark”—is negatively valued; having it “spoils” the person's full humanity (Major & O'Brien, 2005). Being marginalized because of a stigma induces feelings of threat and a loss of social power;

Section Summary

stigma

An attribute that serves to discredit a person in the eyes of others

the stigma engulfs the person's entire identity (Oswald, 2007). It becomes a central trait for that person (see Chapter 4, p. 138), shaping the meaning of all other traits.

In his classic monograph, *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*, Erving Goffman (1963) distinguished the following three different categories of stigma:

1. *Tribal identities*: race, sex, ethnicity, religion, and national origin
2. *Blemishes of individual character*: mental disorders, addictions, homosexuality, and criminality
3. *Abominations of the body*: physical deformities, physical disabilities, diseases, and obesity

The concept of stigma is related to prejudice and discrimination because people who are stigmatized are almost always the targets of intolerance, which can be either subtle or blatant. While anyone can be stereotyped, research indicates that members of stigmatized groups are more frequently stereotyped than members of nonstigmatized groups (Adams et al., 2006). In one such investigation, Jonathan Cook and his colleagues (2011) conducted a 7-day experiential-sampling study in which they measured stigmatized and nonstigmatized individuals' reactions to being stereotyped while they engaged in normal daily activities. Some of the participants were members of stigmatized groups in American society (African Americans, gay men, and lesbians), while other participants were members of the dominant group in the country (heterosexual Caucasian Americans). As expected, participants who were members of stigmatized groups reported more frequent stereotyping than did nonstigmatized participants. For members of all groups, being stereotyped was associated with feeling more socially anxious and inhibited in "being oneself," as well as feeling low in social power. In essence, rather than feeling in control of the situation, stereotyped people felt like they were controlled by the situation and by the stereotyped role they had been cast into.

Although many societal groups fall into one of the stigma categories, let us examine examples from three different categories that are of particular importance in contemporary society. First we will examine intergroup intolerance associated with race-based and sex-based tribal identity stigmas; then we will analyze intolerance based on perceived blemishes of individual character (homosexuality/bisexuality and mental illness) and perceived abominations of the body (obesity).

6.2a Race-Based Appearance Cues Can Trigger Discrimination.

Prejudice and discrimination based on a person's racial background is called **racism**. Blatantly negative stereotypes based on a belief in the racial superiority of one's own group coupled with open opposition to racial equality characterize *old-fashioned racism*. Old-fashioned racism involves contemptuous prejudice and often leads to movement against the despised group, including physical violence.

Although old-fashioned racism is far less common in contemporary American society than a generation ago, racial stereotypes continue to provide fuel for volatile expressions of prejudice and discrimination. Due to socialization about what constitutes different racial categories, a person's skin color and facial characteristics (such as the shape of the eyes, nose, and lips) are physical features that often automatically activate racial



Do you have an attribute that discredits you in the eyes of others? Members of stigmatized groups face social challenges that nonstigmatized individuals do not encounter.
(iStock)

racism

Prejudice and discrimination based on a person's racial background

stereotypes among people of many different ethnicities in the United States—as well as in a number of countries around the world (Maddox, 2004). When such race-based stereotype activation occurs, people generally associate more positive personality traits with those with lighter skin and Eurocentric facial features than with those with darker skin and Afrocentric features (Blair et al., 2002; Livingston & Brewer, 2002). Furthermore, the more Afrocentric the features of the target person in these studies, the more she or he is assumed to have the traits that are stereotypically associated with African Americans.

Research suggests that when a person of any race makes a judgment on the basis of physical appearance, the target person's race-related features may influence social judgments in two ways (Blair et al., 2004; Judd et al., 2004). First, those features provide the basis for racial categorization, which then activates the relevant stereotypes. Second, those features may directly activate race-associated stereotypes even for a person who is not a member of the relevant race. Thus, a man with curly hair and a darker complexion who identifies himself as “white” and is also categorized by others as “white” may still be nonconsciously perceived by others as having characteristics stereotypically associated with black males.

This tendency to negatively stereotype those with darker skin and Afrocentric facial features is found even among African Americans (Clark & Clark, 1939, 1947). For example, when African American teenagers were surveyed about their skin tone preferences (Anderson & Cromwell, 1977), they associated very light-brown skin with positive characteristics (the prettiest skin, the smartest girl, the children fathers like best) and black skin with more negative traits (the dumbest person, the person one would not like to marry, the color one would prefer not to be). Further, when African American children were read stories in which black characters were portrayed in either stereotype-

consistent or stereotype-inconsistent ways, they were more likely to remember stories containing light-skinned blacks associated with positive traits and high-status occupations or dark-skinned blacks associated with negative traits and low-status occupations (Averhart & Bigler, 1997). These findings are consistent with the general observation that lighter-skinned blacks attain higher status in society than darker-skinned blacks (Hughes & Hertel, 1990). In fact, some social scientists contend that the social status gap between light- and dark-skinned blacks in the United States is as large as the gap between whites and blacks (Hunter, 1998). Similar social status gaps are also found among lighter-skinned and darker-skinned Mexican Americans (Telles & Marguia, 1990).

The negative effects of automatically stereotyping people with Afrocentric facial features can have real-world, life-and-death consequences. For example, around midnight on February 4, 1999, four white New York City police officers were looking for a rape suspect in the Bronx when they saw 22-year-old Amadou Diallo—a West African immigrant—standing in his apartment building doorway. Stopping their car, they told Diallo to “freeze,” but then they saw him reach into his pants' pocket. Fearing that this suspicious-looking man was reaching for a weapon, the officers drew their pistols and opened fire. Within 5 seconds they had fired a total of 41 shots at the unarmed Diallo, 19 of which found their mark, killing him. The object that Diallo was reaching for was his wallet, which contained his ID. The officers were tried for murder but were acquitted of all charges on the grounds that, although they made a mistake, their actions were justified (Fritsch, 2000).



The mistaken shooting of Amadou Diallo by New York City police officers is widely considered an example of the sometimes deadly consequences of racial profiling. Was his killing caused by implicit racism? (AP World Wide Photo)

Motivated by this high-profile case and the resulting charges of racism and racial profiling by law enforcement officers, Keith Payne (2001) conducted a series of studies to understand how the mere presence of a black face could cause people to misidentify harmless objects as weapons. In his research, Payne showed pictures of guns or tools to white participants and asked them to classify the objects as quickly as possible. Just prior to seeing an object, participants were primed by a brief presentation of either a white or a black face (see Figure 6.3). Results indicated that when a black face immediately preceded a tool, the tool was significantly more likely to be mistaken for a handgun compared with conditions in which this same tool was preceded with a white face. This stereotype difference emerged mainly when participants were required to react quickly, a condition that mimics the time pressure involved in real-world police confrontations like the Diallo shooting.

As you recall from our previous discussion of implicit prejudice (p.218), when whites with high implicit but low explicit race prejudice see an unfamiliar black face, brain regions that trigger fear and threat responses are activated. Combined with the present results, this research suggests that simply seeing a black man may automatically and nonconsciously trigger a fear response in police officers due to racial stereotypes. Further, under conditions that require quick and decisive action, this race-based reaction may result in police officers misperceiving harmless objects as weapons. This perceptual bias does not simply reflect explicit prejudice toward African Americans. Instead, this effect appears to be caused by the racial stereotypes that exist in our culture (Judd et al., 2004).

Figure 6.3 Race and the Misperception of Weapons

After being primed by black or white faces, white participants were shown pictures of guns or tools and asked to classify the objects (Payne, 2001). When participants were required to react quickly, they were more likely to misidentify tools as guns after being primed with black faces rather than with white faces. How does this research provide insight into police shootings of unarmed suspects in real-world confrontations?



(Dreamstime, iStock)

Source: "Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon," by B. K. Payne, 2001, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81, pp. 181–192.

Subsequent studies using computer-simulated “shooter/nonshooter” scenarios have verified these findings and have also found evidence suggesting that if a suspected criminal is black (versus white), people generally require less certainty that he is, in fact, holding a gun before they decide to shoot him (Greenwald et al., 2003; Ito et al., 2006). Importantly, this race-based bias was found in both African American and white participants (Correll et al., 2002). Thus, African American police officers may be as likely as white officers to misperceive that a black man is holding a weapon and respond by shooting in self-defense.

The tendency for racial biases to shape quick decisions—and even to alter what we think we have seen—is due to the fact that negative racial stereotypes are often readily accessible from long-term memory. For example, Vaughn Becker and his coworkers (2010) asked participants to view a white face and a black face—one angry and one neutral—for one-tenth of a second and then asked them to add two numbers that had accompanied the faces (see Figure 6.4). When later asked to describe what they could recall about the faces they had briefly seen, participants’ memories reflected racial bias: They were almost twice as likely to falsely recall anger on a black face than to falsely recall anger on a white face.

Overall, these studies suggest that race-based bias is very difficult to monitor and control because it is operating below a person’s level of conscious awareness. However, results also indicate that when given ample time, people make few stereotypical misidentifications of weapons because their automatic, reflexive response is controlled and altered by more deliberate cognitive analysis. Of course, the problem here is that urging a police officer to react slowly during a confrontation with a potentially armed suspect can be extremely dangerous for the officer.

In considering the implications of these studies, it must be kept in mind that participants were not actual members of a police force. Is it possible that police training reduces or eliminates this race-based shooter bias by teaching officers to focus on the presence of a weapon during confrontations rather than fixating on the target’s race? Joshua Correll and his coworkers (2007) tested this possibility in a series of studies comparing police officers to similarly matched community members. Results indicated that the police officers were significantly faster in correctly identifying the presence of a weapon, and

Figure 6.4 Racial Biases Can Shape Our Social Perceptions.

When briefly shown a black face and a white face, one neutral and the other angry, participants more often recalled the black rather than the white face as angry (Becker et al., 2010).



(Shutterstock)

were less “trigger-happy” when the target was black, than other community members. However, the police officers still manifested racial bias in the speed with which they made shoot/don’t shoot decisions: They were much faster in accurately responding when the targets were armed blacks or unarmed whites than when the targets were unarmed blacks or armed whites. Additional research indicates that officers who have had positive personal contact with blacks are better able to eliminate the shooter bias with simulation training (Peruche & Plant, 2006). Together, these studies inform us that police training does reduce race-based shooter bias, but it does not eliminate it.

6.2b Modern Racism Is More Ambivalent than Openly Hostile.

Although American race relations have significantly improved over the past 50 years, surveys of African Americans find that more than half still report having at least 13 racial hassles per year (Sellers & Shelton, 2003). Most racial hassles involve brief interactions with strangers in which respondents were ignored, overlooked, not given service, treated rudely, or perceived as a threat. Other minorities in the United States report comparable prejudice experiences (Park et al., 2009). What are some of the underlying causes of this subtler form of racism?

Aversive Racism

In studying less blatant manifestations of racism, most of the research during the past 30 years has examined white Americans’ racial attitudes (Pearson et al., 2009). Researchers such as Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio (2000) and Irwin Katz and R. Glen Hass (1988) assert that the fundamental nature of white Americans’ current attitudes toward many racial groups—but especially toward African Americans—is complex and conflicted. They contend that on the one hand, the majority of whites hold to egalitarian values that stress equal treatment of all people and often experience a sense of collective guilt with the realization that their ingroup has harmed and mistreated other social groups in the past. Therefore, they sympathize with the victims of racial prejudice and tend to support public policies that promote racial equality.

On the other hand, because of exposure to unflattering stereotypes and media images depicting African Americans as lazy, unmotivated, and violent, and due to simple ingroup-outgroup biases, these researchers believe that many whites come to possess negative feelings and beliefs about blacks that directly contradict their egalitarian values. The American individualist value of the Protestant work ethic, which emphasizes self-reliance and individual initiative in pursuing life goals, reinforces these negative social perceptions about blacks. Given their own relative lack of personal experience with the negative impact of racial prejudice, many whites tend to believe that anyone who works hard has a good chance of succeeding in life. Therefore, many of them conclude that at least part of the source of continued racial inequality is what they perceive as a low level of motivation and effort on the part of blacks and other disadvantaged groups, such as American Indians and Latinos (Adams et al., 2008).

According to this perspective on contemporary racism, the negative feelings engendered by whites’ perceptions of disadvantaged racial groups do not encompass anger or contempt, as in old-fashioned racism; however, they do include uneasiness and even fear. As you recall, these are the precise emotions activated when whites with high implicit and low explicit racial prejudice see an unfamiliar black face (refer back to pp. 223–227). Due to the fact that an egalitarian value system plays an important role in many white Americans’ self-concepts, this perspective assumes that they typically do not even acknowledge to themselves—much less

to others—that they have these negative feelings. Because interacting with members of these other racial groups tends to make whites aware of their negative—though not fully understood—racial feelings and beliefs, they avoid such interactions; thus they avoid confronting their hidden prejudice (Nail et al., 2003). This is why the combination of both positive and

“He flattered himself on being a man without any prejudices; and this pretension itself is a very great prejudice.”

—Anatole France, French novelist and poet, 1844–1924

negative beliefs and feelings about a particular racial group is called **aversive racism**. Interracial encounters make salient the attitudinal conflict, and this awareness threatens one’s self-concept as a fair-minded person.

One study, conducted by Katz and Hass (1988), suggests that many white Americans may indeed have conflicting attitudes regarding African Americans. In this research, white college students first completed a questionnaire that either contained items measuring adherence to the individualist Protestant ethic of self-reliance, initiative, and hard work or contained egalitarian and humanitarian items stressing equal treatment of all people and empathy for those who are less fortunate (see Table 6.2). When participants completed the questionnaire, the researchers administered a second questionnaire that measured their explicit prejudice toward blacks. Because Katz and Hass believed that both sets of values were part of the participants’ worldview, they predicted that participants’ *explicit prejudice* would be influenced by whichever of these two values was made salient. Consistent with this hypothesis, when whites were first primed by egalitarian statements, their subsequent prejudice scores went down. When they were primed by individualist work ethic statements, their prejudice scores went up. This is what one would expect if the participants held both value orientations. In any given situation, whichever value is made salient will exert the most influence over attitudes and behavior.

Table 6.2 Conflicting American Values Related to Racial Ambivalence

People with a strong Protestant ethic would agree with the sample items from the first scale, while those with a strong humanitarianism-egalitarianism value orientation would agree with the sample items from the scale bearing its name. According to Katz and Hass (1988), if a white American believes in both of these value orientations, what sort of attitudinal conflict might this create in his or her overall perceptions of African Americans or American Indians?

The Protestant Ethic <i>(Sample Items from Katz & Hass, 1988)</i>	Humanitarianism-Egalitarianism <i>(Sample Items from Katz & Hass, 1988)</i>
1. Most people who don’t succeed in life are just plain lazy.	1. One should find ways to help others less fortunate than oneself.
2. Anyone who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding.	2. There should be equality for everyone—because we are all human beings.
3. If people work hard enough they are able to make a good life for themselves.	3. Everyone should have an equal chance and an equal say in most things.
4. Most people spend too much time in unprofitable amusements.	4. Acting to protect the rights and interests of other members of the community is a major obligation for all persons.

aversive racism

Attitudes toward members of a racial group that incorporate both egalitarian social values and negative emotions, causing one to avoid interaction with members of the group

Katz and Hass believe that another consequence of whites having ambivalent attitudes toward minority groups is that it can cause them to act in a more extreme manner toward minority members than they would to other whites (Katz et al., 1986).

This tendency for responses to become more extreme when one holds ambivalent attitudes is called *response amplification*; and it can occur in either a favorable or an unfavorable direction, depending on the social context (Hass et al., 1991). Thus, whites with ambivalent attitudes toward blacks may act overfriendly and solicitous when being introduced to African Americans whom they perceive to be competent and ambitious. This is because such encounters discredit the negative components of their ambivalent attitudes. Likewise, they may react with great annoyance and anger when interacting with blacks whom they judge to be incompetent and lazy because the encounter discredits the positive component of their ambivalent attitudes. When either one of these components has been discredited in a given situation, the person's evaluative response is likely to be exaggerated in the opposing direction.

As you might guess, when aversive racists cannot easily avoid interacting with African Americans or with members of other minority groups for whom they hold similarly ambivalent attitudes, the resulting exchanges are often uncomfortable for both parties (Dovidio, 2001). During such interactions, aversive racists—who generally sincerely believe that they are not prejudiced—consciously focus on their egalitarian attitudes and actively monitor and regulate their self-presentations to convey warmth and friendliness. Simultaneously, they try to ignore the feelings of discomfort that are induced by their implicit prejudice.

In contrast, based on past interactions with aversive racists, many minority group members have learned to attend not just to white individuals' consciously constructed self-presentations but also to their nonverbal behavior for evidence of implicit prejudice. Nonverbal behavior related to negative arousal and tension in face-to-face interactions includes such things as excessive blinking, gaze aversion, and forced smiles. When minority group members detect these behaviors, they feel more uncomfortable and less satisfied with the interaction than the aversive racists do (Vorauer & Kumhyr, 2001).

In other words, the research evidence suggests that because aversive racists pay most attention to their consciously held egalitarian attitudes and overtly friendly self-presentations, whereas their minority partners pay most attention to aversive racists' less consciously controlled—and less friendly—nonverbal behaviors, these two conversational partners often have different reactions to their interracial exchange (Dovidio et al., 2002). While aversive racists often walk away feeling relieved that things “went well” and comforted by the belief that they indeed are nonprejudiced, minorities often walk away feeling angry and certain that they have just encountered another prejudiced white person (Penner et al., 2010).

“You learn about equality in history and civics,
but you find out life is not really like that.”

—Arthur Ashe, professional tennis player, 1943–1993

What About Racial Prejudice Among Minority Group Members?

Because minorities are much more likely than whites to be the targets of racial discrimination, minority race bias is often overlooked in the larger culture (Shelton, 2000). One important finding is that, just as whites' racial attitudes vary from positive to negative, so too do the racial attitudes of minorities. Despite being the target of prejudice from whites, not all blacks, Asians, Latinos, and American Indians are prejudiced against whites (Shelton, 2000). Studies also suggest that although many whites' negative attitudes toward blacks are related to their perception that blacks are not living up to cherished values (such as industriousness and perseverance), many blacks' racial attitudes originate primarily from perceptions of threat or conflict and from their reaction to white racism (Monteith & Spicer, 2000).

“Racism breeds racism in reverse.”

—Mary Brave Bird, Sioux (Lakota) Nation

A profound example of this perceived threat from mainstream society that many African Americans experience was on display following the 2014 police-shooting death of unarmed black teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Consistent with previous research indicating a huge racial gap in perceptions of fairness in our criminal justice system (Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005), a national survey conducted after Brown’s death found that black adults were almost three times less likely to believe that race does not affect police use of deadly force (20% versus 58%) and were more than twice as likely than white adults to believe that police in most communities are more likely to use deadly force against a black person than a white person (71% versus 31%). Other minority groups’ threat-based prejudicial attitudes toward whites have similar origins.

Just as whites often have ambivalent attitudes toward various minority groups, there is evidence that minority groups have ambivalent attitudes toward whites (Livingston, 2002). Minority group ambivalence may be caused by resenting the social power given to whites, while simultaneously depending on this power to gain social status and financial rewards, or respecting whites for certain positive traits associated with their group (Shelton, 2000). This represents a form of envious prejudice.

Another reason that minority groups’ racial perceptions and attitudes might differ from those of whites is that, because of their history of being the targets of oppression, people of color are much more likely to consider their race and ethnicity to be important aspects of their self-concepts. For example, when black and white Americans are questioned about their perceptions and attitudes toward each race, differences in the ways in which these two groups are socialized to think about race appear to increase the likelihood of misunderstandings and conflicts (Judd et al., 1995; Ryan et al., 2007). Young whites are generally socialized to avoid thinking about racial differences

and stereotypes because such thinking is considered the source of prejudice and discrimination. In contrast, young blacks are typically socialized to emphasize their ethnic identity and to recognize the differences between themselves and whites because such thinking is considered to help them better deal with ongoing prejudice and discrimination.

Both of these perspectives have psychological merit: Stereotyping and recognizing group differences can lead to prejudice, and developing an ethnic identity can insulate one from many of the negative effects of prejudice. The former view emphasizes eliminating known causes of prejudice, while the latter perspective emphasizes protecting oneself from existing prejudice. To a certain extent, white Americans’ racial views contend that an ideal society should be a “melting pot” or “color blind,” in which everyone is judged equally regardless of their race or ethnicity. In contrast, black Americans tend to believe that eliminating their racial identity in a cultural melting pot would strip them of their most important defense against racism. Instead, their perspective on race contends that society is a “patchwork quilt” in which their group’s unique strengths and qualities buffer them from ongoing racism.

These two contrasting views on the wisdom of recognizing race in one’s life and using it as a basis for making social judgments may partly explain why many blacks and whites hold different opinions about social issues such as affirmative action (Crosby et al., 2006). Whereas whites may believe that such programs create unhealthy racial divisions and emphasize group differences, blacks may believe that these programs serve to correct the continuing unfair treatment of minorities in society. Here, once again, we see how differences in our definitions of social reality lead to sharply contrasting social judgments.



The 2014 police-shooting death of unarmed teen Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, was perceived by many people as a chilling example of the extreme danger that young black men face from America’s criminal justice system—a danger not shared nearly to the same degree by young white men. How might such social perceptions shape people’s racial attitudes? (Shutterstock)

Despite the potential merits of both viewpoints, research indicates that the “patchwork quilt” perspective is more effective in reducing implicit racial bias in the United States than the “melting pot” perspective (Norton et al., 2006; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). Indeed, research suggests that underlying the “melting pot” perspective is a fear on the part of some white Americans that multiculturalism is a threat to their dominant group’s core values and societal power. The white Americans who are most likely to react negatively to multiculturalism are those who identify strongly with their ethnicity and have a strong desire to maintain their group’s social dominance (Morrison et al., 2010).

Similar sentiments against multiculturalism have been expressed throughout Europe (see German Chancellor Merkel’s comments in our chapter-opening story) during the past decades. For many Americans expressing such views, the “melting pot” perspective is driven less by a valuing of color blindness and more by a valuing of ingroup dominance. Given the fact that racial and ethnic minorities now make up more than half of the total population in California, Hawaii, New Mexico, and Texas—and given the prediction that individuals of nonwhite descent will likely become the “new majority” in the United States somewhere between 2040 and 2050 (Burnstein, 2005; Ortman & Guarneri, 2009)—it appears that multiculturalism is here to stay. Facing this reality, the more that white Americans think of their ethnicity as being “one of many” ethnicities in a multicultural society rather than being *the* ethnicity by which all others are judged, the more likely they will be to embrace multiculturalism (Plaut et al., 2009; Wolsko et al., 2006).

6.2c Sexism Has Both a Hostile and a Benevolent Component.

Another destructive form of intergroup intolerance is based on a person’s sex—namely, **sexism** (Swim & Hyers, 2009). Much as racism in Western societies is mostly discussed in terms of white hostility toward racial minority groups, sexism around the globe primarily focuses on the prejudice and discrimination that males direct at females. This is so because virtually all societies in the world are *patriarchal*, meaning that the social organization is such that males dominate females (Neely, 2008). Evolutionary theorists propose that the social dominance of men over women is probably due to the biology of human sexual reproduction, in which the competition between males for sexual access to females eventually resulted in men being more aggressive and having a stronger social dominance orientation than women. As outlined by social dominance theory (see p. 251), the patriarchal systems that resulted from males’ greater eventually led to the development of a sexist ideology to justify control over females (Krefting, 2003; Sidanius et al., 1995). The basic storyline of this ideology is that women are inferior and irrational creatures who need to be controlled by men. This patriarchal belief system underlying *old-fashioned sexism* justifies continued oppression and has many psychological similarities to old-fashioned racism.



Research suggests that the “patchwork quilt” perspective on ethnic diversity reduces prejudices more than the “melting pot” perspective. (Shutterstock)

sexism

Any attitude, action, or institutional structure that subordinates a person because of her or his sex



How have patriarchal beliefs fostered the expression of sexism in society? (Shutterstock)

Ambivalent Sexism

Unlike most dominant-subordinate relationships, in male-female relationships there is a great deal of intimacy: Men are dependent on women as mothers, wives, and sexual/romantic partners. Historically, this intimacy has resulted in many sexist men idealizing women in traditional feminine roles. They cherish these women and want to protect them because these traditional relationships fulfill their dual desires for social dominance and intimacy. However, these same sexist men are hostile toward women in nontraditional gender roles, such as career women and feminists. In other words, these men view women as “wonderful”—provided those women do not step out of traditional gender roles and compete with men for the more socially valued and powerful social roles historically associated with men (Rudman, 2005). Peter Glick and Susan Fiske (1996) contend that this orientation toward women—which is based on both positive and negative attitudes (benevolence and hostility) rather than on uniform dislike—constitutes **ambivalent sexism**.

A field experiment tested Glick and Fiske’s theory by having female confederates pose as either job applicants or customers at retail stores while wearing or not wearing padding that made them appear pregnant (Hebl et al., 2007). How people responded to the confederates was predicted by whether they conformed to traditional gender roles. Store employees behaved more rudely toward the female job applicants when they looked pregnant versus not pregnant, but employees were friendlier toward the female customers when they looked pregnant versus not pregnant. Further, the “pregnant” confederates encountered greater hostility from both men and women when applying for masculine compared to feminine jobs.

A similar set of experimental studies examined the effect of power-seeking intentions on backlash toward women in political office (Okimoto & Brescoll, 2010). Results indicated that both men and women were less likely to vote for a female politician if they believed that she had aspirations for power. No similar negative effects were found for male politicians who sought power. These results suggest that a female politician’s career progress may be hindered by the belief that she seeks power, because such desire violates the feminine gender role and, thus, elicits interpersonal penalties. Together, these findings of benevolent responses toward women who conform to traditional gender roles and hostility toward those who seek nontraditional roles demonstrate how sexist beliefs foster and maintain sexual inequality in the workforce.

The degree to which ambivalent sexist views are held varies from culture to culture and is related to cultural differences in gender equality (Glick et al., 2004; Sakalli-Ugurlu & Glick, 2003). As demonstrated in the pregnant-nonpregnant field experiment, although benevolent sexist beliefs lead people to express many positive attitudes about women, they share common assumptions with hostile sexism—namely, that women belong in restricted domestic roles and are the “weaker” sex. Both beliefs serve to justify male social dominance (Feather, 2004). For example, in Turkey, Brazil, and Japan, men and women who endorse hostile and benevolent sexist beliefs toward women justify and also minimize domestic violence against women; they are also more likely to blame women for triggering the violence against them (Glick et al., 2002; Yamawaki et al., 2009). Spend a few minutes completing the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory in *Self/Social Connection Exercise 6.1*.

ambivalent sexism

Sexism directed against women based on both positive and negative attitudes (hostility and benevolence) rather than on uniform dislike

Self/Social Connection



Exercise 6.1

What Is Your Degree of Ambivalent Sexism Toward Women?

The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory

Instructions

Below is a series of statements concerning men and women and their relationships in contemporary society. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each statement using the following scale:

- | | |
|-----------------------|--------------------|
| 0 = Disagree strongly | 3 = Agree slightly |
| 1 = Disagree somewhat | 4 = Agree somewhat |
| 2 = Disagree slightly | 5 = Agree strongly |

1. No matter how accomplished he is, a man is not truly complete as a person unless he has the love of a woman.
2. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for “equality.”
3. In a disaster, women ought not necessarily be rescued before men.*
4. Most women interpret innocent remarks as being sexist.
5. Women are too easily offended.
6. People are often truly happy in life without being romantically involved with a member of the other sex.*
7. Feminists are not seeking for women to have more power than men.*
8. Many women have a quality of purity that few men possess.
9. Women should be cherished and protected by men.
10. Most women fail to appreciate fully all that men do for them.
11. Women seek to gain power by getting control over men.
12. Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores.
13. Men are complete without women.*
14. Women exaggerate problems they have at work.
15. Once a woman gets a man to commit to her, she usually tries to put him on a tight leash.
16. When women lose to men in a fair competition, they typically complain about being discriminated against.
17. A good woman should be set on a pedestal by her man.
18. There are actually very few women who get a kick out of teasing men by seeming sexually available and then refusing male advances.*
19. Women, compared with men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility.
20. Men should be willing to sacrifice their own well-being in order to provide financially for the women in their lives.
21. Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands of men.*
22. Women, as compared with men, tend to have a more refined sense of culture and good taste.

(Continues)

Scoring Instructions

Before summing either scale, first reverse the scores for the “*” items:

0 = 5, 1 = 4, 2 = 3, 3 = 2, 4 = 1, 5 = 0.

Hostile Sexism Scale Score: Add items 2, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21.

The average score for men is about 29, while the average score for women is about 20.

Higher scores indicate greater degrees of hostile sexism.

Benevolent Sexism Scale Score: Add items 1, 3, 6, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20, 22.

The average score for men is about 28, while the average score for women is about 24.

Higher scores indicate greater degrees of benevolent sexism.

Total Ambivalent Sexism Inventory Score: Sum the Hostile Sexism Scale score and the Benevolent Sexism Scale score.

The average score for men is about 57, while the average score for women is about 44.

Higher scores indicate greater degrees of ambivalent sexism.



How might some Americans' negative reactions to Hillary Clinton as a politician be explained by ambivalent sexism and the belief that she has a desire for power?
(Wikimedia Commons)

Based on your understanding of cognitive dissonance theory (Chapter 5, pp. 174–181), you might be wondering how ambivalent sexists avoid feeling conflicted about their positive and negative beliefs and attitudes toward women. Shouldn't people experience considerable dissonance if they simultaneously believe that women are inferior, ungrateful, sexual teasers who are also refined, morally superior goddesses?

In two separate studies investigating this apparent internal contradiction, Glick and his colleagues (1997) asked men and women to spontaneously list the different categories they use to classify women. Men who scored high and low on the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI) generated many of the same subcategories, but ambivalent sexists evaluated their traditional and nontraditional female subcategories in a much more polarized fashion than did the nonsexists. Ambivalent sexist men's negative feelings (fear, envy, competitiveness, intimidation) toward career women were predicted by their degree of hostile sexism, not by their degree of benevolent sexism. Similarly, these men's positive feelings (warmth, respect, trust, happiness) toward homemakers were predicted by their degree of benevolent sexism, not by their degree of hostile sexism. These findings suggest that, among

ambivalent sexist men, specific categories of women activate either hostility or benevolence, but not both. Apparently, reserving negative attitudes for nontraditional women (the “bad” women) and positive attitudes for those who are traditional (the “good” women) allows sexist men to simultaneously hold contradictory views of women in general.

What about women who hold sexist attitudes toward other women? Do they also evaluate traditional and nontraditional women in a similar polarized benevolent-hostile manner? Apparently not. When female participants completed this same task, their degree of benevolent sexism was not significantly correlated with evaluations of these two categories of women, although sexist—as compared with nonsexist—women also evaluated career women less favorably and reported more positive feelings for homemakers. These findings suggest that the sexism of women against other women is not of the polarized variety

“We have mistresses for our enjoyment, concubines to serve our person, and wives for the bearing of legitimate offspring.”

—Demosthenes, Ancient Greek orator, 385–322 BC

seen in sexist men; instead, it simply constitutes an expression of hostility toward women who have not adopted traditional feminine roles.

What About Sexism Expressed by Women Against Men?

Similar to the greater acceptability of racial prejudice expressed by minority groups toward whites, it is generally more acceptable in American society for women to express sexist attitudes toward men than vice versa. This is so because in an egalitarian society, higher-status groups—such as men and whites—are more likely to be considered fair game for criticism. In contrast, because low-status groups—such as women and minorities—have historically been the targets of discrimination by the higher-status groups, criticism of them is much more likely to call into question the critics' egalitarian credentials. What do social scientists know about the often-overlooked expression of sexism by women against men?

One important finding is that just as men's sexism can be described as ambivalent, women also appear to simultaneously hold positive and negative attitudes about men (Glick & Fiske, 1999; Jackson et al., 2001). In childhood, girls exhibit signs of intergender hostility even before boys. Their antiboy attitudes may develop because of the frustration they often experience when interacting with boys, whose dominant play style of grabbing what they want and not taking turns clashes with girls' more polite style of asking for things and sharing play opportunities (Maccoby, 1990). Regardless of whether these conflicting play styles are due to biology, gender socialization, or some combination of the two, the greater power that boys exert in these cross-gender interactions creates resentment of that power among girls. Peter Glick and Lori Hilt (2000) suggest that this hostility represents an early-childhood version of many women's later resentment of patriarchy. Thus, just as patriarchal systems foster the expression of hostile sexism by men, they also create a similar intergender hostility in women.

During adolescence, as heterosexual teenagers grow increasingly interested in members of the other sex as romantic partners, the resulting emotional ties foster the development of benevolent attitudes (Glick & Fiske, 1996). The fact that male power in society can sometimes be used to protect and provide for women's welfare also contributes to the development of benevolent attitudes in both women and men. However, although both men and women develop benevolent attitudes toward the other sex, research suggests that women express much less benevolence than men (Glick & Fiske, 1999). Indeed, women's overall sexist attitudes toward men appear to be more hostile than benevolent, while men's overall sexist attitudes toward women are more clearly ambivalent, with levels of hostility and benevolence being fairly equal. The greater hostility expressed by women, as compared with men, may reflect the more negative experiences that women tend to have during intergender exchanges throughout their lives. This greater negativity is likely caused both by the frustration that women often experience due to men's more dominant interaction style, and by the fact that women are more likely than men to be the targets of sexual harassment and everyday sexism (Seta & Garren, 2011; Swim et al., 2001).

“The prejudice against color, of which we hear so much, is no stronger than that against sex. It is produced by the same cause, and manifested very much in the same way. The Negro's skin and the woman's sex are both *prima facie* evidence that they were intended to be in subjection to the white Saxon man.”

—Elizabeth Cady Stanton, U.S. feminist and abolitionist, 1815–1902

“Our nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination . . . rationalized by an attitude of ‘romantic paternalism’ which, in practical effect, put women not on a pedestal but in a cage.”

—William J. Brennan Jr., U.S. Supreme Court judge, 1906–1997

“But how can a man respect his wife when he has a contemptible opinion of her and her sex, when from his own elevation he looks down on them as void of understanding, full of ignorance and passion, so that folly and a woman are equivalent terms with him?”

—Mary Astell, English pamphleteer, 1666–1731

Like racism, sexism is a complex social problem. Although both men and women hold sexist attitudes and engage in sexist behavior, the ambivalent attitudes constituting male-initiated and female-initiated sexism are different. Current social psychological research suggests that these gender differences in expressing benevolence and hostility toward the other sex are best understood in terms of the respective historical roles that men and women have played as oppressors and oppressed. As a contemporary “actor” in this ongoing gender drama, you now have a better understanding of the social psychological dynamics surrounding sexism. With this knowledge, you are better equipped to redefine gender relations in your own life so that sexism is less problematic for you and for future generations.

6.2d Intolerance Based on Weight, Sexual Orientation, and Mental Illness Is Often Accepted.

Aversive racism and ambivalent sexism both involve the expression of both positive and negative attitudes toward the target group. Yet there are other social groups within society that arouse little positive feelings in those who are biased against them. Instead, these groups are more likely to arouse only feelings of revulsion and contempt. Three examples of such contemptuous prejudice involve weight, sexual orientation, and mental illness.

Antifat Prejudice

Obese people in the United States are subjected to disdain and discrimination in their daily lives, perhaps even more so than individuals (see Chapter 9, p. 388; Crandall et al., 2009). Such prejudice is substantially due to the fact that most people view obesity as a condition that is controllable (Vartanian & Smyth, 2013). Thus heavy individuals—unlike those who are facially unattractive—also are viewed as weak willed, lazy, and self-indulgent (Puhl & Brownell, 2006). In this sense, their stigma involves not only an “abomination of the body” but also a “blemish of individual character.” Antifat prejudice is more pronounced in individualist cultures like the United States and Australia compared with collectivist cultures like Mexico and India, partly because individualists are more likely than collectivists to hold people accountable for personal outcomes (Crandall et al., 2001).

The prejudice and discrimination faced by obese people permeates both their personal and professional lives, and also negatively affects their physical and mental health (Schafer & Ferraro, 2011). They are less likely to be chosen as friends and romantic partners than normal-weight persons, and they are treated in a less friendly manner by healthcare workers (Harvey & Hill, 2001; Hebl et al., 2003). The stigma of obesity is especially strong for women. One study even found that heavier college women were less likely than normal-weight women to receive financial assistance from their own parents (Crandall, 1994). In the job market, obese individuals are discriminated against at every stage of employment, beginning with the hiring process and ending with the firing process (Agerström & Rooth, 2011; Muennig, 2008).

Obesity is such a strong stigmatizing characteristic in our culture that it even affects how people evaluate individuals who are merely seen with obese persons. Michelle Hebl and Laura Mannix (2003) found that an average-weight male job applicant was rated more negatively when seen with an overweight woman prior to a job interview than when seen with a woman of normal weight. Antifat prejudice is so pervasive in our society that even children evaluate normal-weight peers more negatively when they are seen with an obese child (Penny & Haddock, 2007). This tendency for individuals who are associated with stigmatized people to also face negative evaluations from others is known

as **courtesy stigma** (Goffman, 1963). The threat of negative evaluation causes many nonstigmatized people to avoid those who are stigmatized (Swim et al., 1999).

In the United States and Canada, antifat attitudes are stronger among men, whites, and people with traditional gender roles compared with women, blacks, and individuals with nontraditional gender roles (Hebl & Turchin, 2005; Puhl et al., 2008). One explanation for these differences is that the female thinness standard in North American culture is most closely associated with white, heterosexual beauty ideals that are closely aligned with traditional gender roles (see Chapter 9, pp. 391–395). Antifat prejudice can exert a substantial toll upon the well-being of overweight individuals, who often internalize these negative attitudes and experience depression, negative body esteem, and general negative self-esteem (Puhl & Heuer, 2010).

A series of studies have found strong implicit antifat prejudice that is resistant to change, even among people with few explicit antifat attitudes—and even among individuals who were once overweight themselves (Schwartz et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2004). For example, Bethany Teachman and her coworkers (2003) found that even after informing people that obesity is mainly due to genetic factors, there was no significant reduction in their implicit fat bias. When these same individuals read stories of discrimination against obese persons designed to evoke empathy, diminished implicit bias was observed only among those who were overweight. This last finding may be important, given that self-blame and internalizing negative social messages are common in obese individuals. Reminding obese persons about antifat discrimination may promote ingroup support and help them develop a positive social identity (Saguy & Ward, 2011).

As previously discussed in Chapter 3, (p. 81), being categorized as part of a stigmatized group is threatening to the self because self-concept consists not only of your individual attributes but also your identification with social groups. Thus, the problem faced by anyone categorized within a stigmatized group is how to create and maintain a positive sense of self (Major et al., 2012). In many industrialized societies, medical professionals and popular media strongly encourage obese people to improve their social standing—and health—by trying to remove themselves from the stigmatized fat category through dieting, exercise, and other weight-loss strategies, including surgical procedures such as gastric bypass or liposuction (Brochu et al., 2014). In contrast to these widely promoted individual change strategies that stigmatize obesity, a growing number of obese individuals are focusing on collective change strategies to enhance fat people's feelings of self-worth and social status by both altering expanding cultural standards of what is an acceptable body size and by passing laws to prevent weight discrimination (Lindly et al., in press; Nario-Redmond et al., 2013). Throughout North America and Europe, fat acceptance movements are increasingly using legal challenges and other political means to promote anti-size discrimination policies and systemically advance fat acceptance (Fletcher, 2009).

Sexual Prejudice

Despite rigorous scientific studies finding no evidence of an association between homosexuality and psychopathology, many conservative religious and political organizations persist in stigmatizing lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgender individuals as sexually deviant and mentally disturbed—and therefore less deserving of the same civil rights as heterosexual individuals (Herek & Garnets, 2007; Minton, 2002). This societal reaction



*Fat-acceptance movement advocates, such as documentary filmmaker Kira Nerusskaya, contend that TV shows like *The Biggest Loser* perpetuate anti-fat prejudice because the objective of the show is to remove contestants from the stigmatized obese outgroup and into the “healthy” weight ingroup. (Wikipedia)*

courtesy stigma

The tendency for individuals who are associated with stigmatized people to also face negative evaluations from others

is an example of stigma based on “blemishes of individual character,” with nonheterosexual and transgender individuals being targets of a type of contemptuous prejudice (refer

back to p. 220) called **sexual prejudice**. Sexual prejudice refers to all negative attitudes based on sexual orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual (Herek & McLemore, 2013).

Social scientists often explain sexual prejudice as being caused and fueled by **heterosexism**, which is a system of cultural beliefs, values, and customs that exalts heterosexuality and denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behavior or identity (Fernald, 1995; Herek, 2004). Calling another person a “faggot” or a “dyke” is certainly an example of heterosexism, but this cultural belief system also operates on a subtler level. Like the fish that doesn’t realize it’s wet, most people are so used to defining heterosexual behaviors as normal and natural that they cease to think of them as being a manifestation of sexuality. For instance, heterosexuals who wouldn’t look twice at a man and woman holding hands, hugging, or even kissing in public often react very differently if the couple is of the same sex. Gay couples expressing affection in public are typically criticized for flaunting their sexuality. Even when they are not victims of openly blatant discrimination, gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals often experience *interpersonal discrimination*, where they are treated in a less friendly manner and made to feel unwelcome or “invisible” in various social settings (Hebl et al., 2002).

Although many cultures can be characterized as heterosexist, people in those cultures who conform most strongly to socially conservative—and even racist and sexist—value systems are also those who hold extremely negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. In contrast to less-prejudiced individuals, people who express antigay attitudes tend to have the following characteristics:

1. A male rather than female (Ratcliff et al., 2006)
2. Are racially prejudiced, sexist, and authoritarian (Case et al., 2008)
3. Are members of conservative religious organizations (Herek, 1987; Herek & Gonzalez, 2006)
4. Hold traditional attitudes toward gender roles (Kite & Whitley, 1996)
5. Have friends and family who hold similarly negative attitudes (Franklin, 2000; Lehmiller et al., 2010)
6. Have had less personal contact with gay men or lesbians (Sakalli-Ugurlu, 2002; Vonofakou et al., 2007)

Why do heterosexual men have more negative attitudes than heterosexual women? Social scientists contend that this gender difference exists because many cultures emphasize the importance of heterosexuality in the male gender role in particular (Jellison et al., 2004). A defining characteristic of this *heterosexual masculinity* is to reject men who violate the heterosexual norm—namely, gay men. This is also why heterosexual men express more negative attitudes toward gay men than toward lesbians. They perceive a male transgression of the heterosexual norm to be a more serious violation than a female transgression. As we will discuss in Chapter 10 (p. 434), the fact

“Though your tissues gel, And you rot in hell, Don’t feel gloomy, friend—It will never end. Happy Death, Faggot Fool.”

—From “death threat Christmas cards” sent to gay students by a hate group at the University of Chicago

“I just thought, ‘Oh God, what if they pick up that I’m gay?’ It was that fear and shame. ... I watched the whole Gay Pride march in Washington in 1993, and I wept when I saw that. I mean I cried so hard, thinking ‘I wish I could be there,’ because I never felt like I belonged anywhere.”

—Ellen DeGeneres, comedian and actor, born 1958

sexual prejudice

Negative attitudes based on sexual orientation, whether the target is homosexual, bisexual, or heterosexual

heterosexism

A system of cultural beliefs, values, and customs that exalts heterosexuality and denies, denigrates, and stigmatizes any nonheterosexual form of behavior or identity

that heterosexual male same-sex friendships are often lacking in emotional tenderness may be mainly due to concerns about not straying from the narrowly defined boundaries of heterosexual masculinity. This is especially true for men with strongly antigay attitudes (Devlin & Cowan, 1985).

People who hold strongly antigay attitudes also have friends who hold similar opinions, consistent with our previous discussion in Chapter 5 (pp. 164–165) about the important role that reference groups play in the formation of attitudes. Research indicates that perceiving social support is very important in encouraging men, but not women, to express antigay attitudes (Herek, 1988). This gender difference suggests that expressing antigay attitudes helps some heterosexual males—especially adolescents—to identify themselves as “real men” and be accepted into heterosexual friendship cliques.


Although sexual prejudice is typically targeted at sexual minorities, heterosexual individuals are also at risk. Friends, family members, and “allies” who take a public stand against sexual prejudice often experience courtesy stigma. Heterosexual individuals can also become victims of sexual prejudice because of “mistaken identity.” That is, due to the fact that sexual orientation is concealable, inferences are often made about people’s sexual orientation based on the degree to which they deviate from traditional gender roles or gendered behavior (Majied, 2010; Poteat et al., 2007). For example, when heterosexual men hug other men in public outside the confines of a sporting event, they run the risk of being labeled “gay” and targeted for verbal and/or physical assault.

Mental Illness Prejudice

All available evidence strongly indicates that people identified as having psychological disorders are often severely stigmatized in the United States and in other Western, African, and Asian cultures (Brohan et al., 2012; Edwards, 2014). In the United States, a national survey found that Americans perceived people with psychological disorders as dangerous and as less capable than the average person of handling their daily affairs (Pescosolido et al., 1999). Such stigmatization is fostered and strengthened by television shows, movies, and news outlets that regularly portray people with often-unnamed mental illnesses as being dangerous and/or incompetent (Angermeyer & Matschinger, 1996). Indeed, one recent study found that the more often people watch television, the less accurate their knowledge is about schizophrenia and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Kimmerle & Cress, 2013). This widespread bias against individuals suffering from psychological disorders extends into our judicial system. Studies of court proceedings in both the United States and Canada find that judges often use and allow others to use language in their courtrooms that stigmatizes mental illness and those who suffer from psychological disorders (Black & Downie, 2013).

Faced with this social stigma and the fear of being negatively evaluated, people with psychological problems often conceal their symptoms and avoid seeking therapy (Held & Owens, 2013; Wahl, 2012). In many Asian countries, the stigma of mental illness is so severe that it can damage the reputation of the family lineage and thereby significantly reduce the marriage and career prospects of other family members (Ng, 1997).

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Try the following exercise. Listen to some of your favorite songs with lyrics involving romance. Do you tend to automatically imagine that the person singing the song is expressing his or her love for a person of the other sex? How do these reactions relate to heterosexism? Now, actively imagine that the song is about same-sex love. How do you react to these lyrics and any visual images that come to mind?

“It wasn’t easy telling my parents that I’m gay. I made my carefully worded announcement at Thanksgiving. I said, ‘Mom, would you please pass the gravy to a homosexual.’ Then my Aunt Lorraine piped in, ‘Bob, you’re gay. Are you seeing a psychiatrist?’ I said, ‘No, I’m seeing a lieutenant in the Navy.’”

—Bob Smith, American comedian, born 1959



The stigma surrounding psychological disorders causes many people to avoid seeking help. What is one of the most common stereotypes about people with mental illness? (Shutterstock)

This stigma is also pervasive among Asian Americans in the United States (Moon & Cho, 2012). For example, a mental health survey in Los Angeles (Zhang et al., 1998) found that Asian Americans were less than half as likely as white Americans to mention their mental health problems to a friend or relative (12% versus 25%), and only 4% stated that they would seek help from a psychiatrist or psychotherapist (compared to 26% of white Americans). In addition to preventing people from seeking help for their psychological problems, the stigma surrounding mental illness lowers self-esteem while increasing a sense of social isolation and hopelessness.

So what is the truth about one of the most common stereotypes of the mentally ill—namely, that they are more violent than the average person? One study monitored the behavior of more than 1,000 individuals during the year after they had been discharged from psychiatric hospitals (Steadman et al., 1998). Results found no significant difference in the incidence of violence between the former patients and a control group of people living in the same neighborhoods with no history of serious mental health problems. Other research indicates that heightened violence is only slightly more likely among people with severe psychological disorders who are currently experiencing extreme psychological symptoms, such as bizarre delusional thoughts and hallucinated voices (Link et al., 1992). All other individuals with psychological disorders who are not experiencing these severe symptoms are no more likely than the average person to be violent. Thus, the research clearly indicates that the cultural stereotype associating mental illness with violence is grossly exaggerated and largely unfounded. However, until such negative stereotypes surrounding psychological disorders are reduced, the stigma of the mental illness label will remain the most formidable obstacle to future progress in the area of mental health.

6.2e Stigmatized Groups Can Experience Stereotype Threat.

A common belief about women is that they are not as good at math as men. Is it possible that, when competing against male students in a college math course, female students might feel intimidated by the nagging possibility that they might confirm this negative stereotype? Similarly, black students enrolled in largely white schools and colleges sometimes feel that they carry the burden of “representing their race” in academic pursuits. Accompanying this concern is the added social stigma associated with the minority label, which often implies a suspicion of intellectual inferiority (Shapiro, 2011). Because these negative stereotypes are widely known throughout society, both female and black students are susceptible to developing what Claude Steele (1997) identified as **stereotype threat**, since they are the targets of such stereotyping. Stereotype threat is the apprehension people feel when performing a task in which their group is stereotyped to lack ability (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele et al., 2002). People experience this apprehension because they are concerned that if they perform poorly, they will be confirming or perpetuating the negative stereotype (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007).

Physiological measures of people experiencing stereotype threat indicate that this uncomfortable psychological state triggers arousal, and this arousal can hinder task performance in at least two different ways. First, when the task involves complex cognitive skills, the arousal creates an extra cognitive burden that reduces individuals’ working memory capacity (Ben-Zeev et al., 2005; Bonnot & Croizet, 2007). People experiencing such stereotype threat have a more difficult time concentrating on the task and quickly

stereotype threat

The apprehension people feel when performing a task in which their group is stereotyped to lack ability

remembering relevant information. Second, when the task requires the execution of well-learned skills that do not rely heavily on working memory, the arousal triggered by stereotype threat induces too much attention to how the task is being executed (Beilock et al., 2006). In such instances, instead of allowing their actions to “flow” unimpeded, people begin second-guessing well-learned responses, and their performance suffers. Regardless of whether the arousal disrupts working memory or well-learned motor skills, the disruption can occur even without the person consciously experiencing any anxiety (Blascovich et al., 2001).

The first evidence for the stereotype threat effect among African American college students came from a series of experiments conducted by Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995). In one of these studies, black and white student volunteers were given a difficult English test. In the *stereotype threat condition*, the test was described as a measure of intellectual ability; in the *nonstereotype threat condition*, it was described as a laboratory problem-solving task that did not measure intelligence. Because cultural stereotypes depict blacks as intellectually inferior to whites, the researchers presumed that describing the test as an intellectual measure would make this negative stereotype relevant to the black students’ performance. They also expected that making this stereotype relevant would induce concern in the black students that they might confirm the stereotype (“If I do poorly, my performance will reflect badly on my race and on me”). Steele and Aronson hypothesized that the self-evaluation apprehension created by such thinking would interfere with the black students’ performance. In contrast, when the task was described as not measuring intelligence, the researchers assumed that this would make the negative racial stereotype about ability *irrelevant* to the black students’ performance; therefore, it would not arouse stereotype threat. As you can see in Figure 6.5, when the test was presented as a measure of ability, blacks performed worse than whites—consistent with the stereotype threat hypothesis. However, when it was not associated with ability, no significant racial differences were found.


Stereotype threat has also been found among women in math classes (Gunderson et al., 2011; Steffens & Jelenec, 2010). In one of the first studies documenting this effect, Steven Spencer and his colleagues (1999) gave male and female college students a difficult math test but divided it into two halves and presented it as two distinct tests. Half of the students were told that the first test was one on which men outperformed women, and that the second test was one on which there were no gender differences. The other students were told the opposite—Test 1 was described as exhibiting no gender differences, but men outperformed women on Test 2. As you can see in Figure 6.6, consistent with the stereotype threat hypothesis, when told that the test yielded gender differences, women greatly underperformed in relation to men. However, when the test was described as not exhibiting any gender differences, women’s underperformance disappeared. This dramatic change occurred even though the two tests were the same!

Subsequent research has found that merely placing women in a room where men outnumber them is sometimes sufficient to induce stereotype threat and lower math performance (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2003). However, additional research suggests that women are less susceptible to stereotype threat in math performance when they have consistently had positive math experiences in school and also have parents and teachers who encouraged and intentionally sheltered them from negative gender stereotypes (Oswald & Harvey, 2003). These high-achieving women not only have strong confidence in their math abilities, they also have little awareness of negative gender stereotypes in the area of math.

Other studies find that women who become immersed and successful in academic math environments appear to insulate themselves from stereotype threat by *disidentifying* with feminine characteristics and behavior seen as incompatible with math success (such as being flirtatious or wearing a lot of makeup)—but not with those

Figure 6.5 African American Intellectual Test Performance and Stereotype Threat

Steele and Aronson (1995) administered a difficult English test to black and white college students. When the test was described as a measure of intellectual ability (stereotype threat condition), blacks performed worse than whites. However, when it was not associated with ability (nonstereotype threat condition), no racial differences were found. How are these findings consistent with the stereotype threat hypothesis?



feminine characteristics (such as being sensitive, nurturing, and having good fashion sense) perceived as unlikely to hinder such success (Pronin et al., 2004). Some other ways that women can insulate themselves from stereotype threat are by consciously developing positive math attitudes, avoiding social comparisons to men, and developing a social identity (for example, math major or psychology research assistant) that has positive stereotypes for math performance (Forbes & Schamder, 2010; Rydell & Boucher, 2010; von Hippel et al., 2011). Overall, this and other research suggests that one effective way to reduce the negative effects of stereotype threat among women regarding their performance in traditional masculine domains is to discourage them from internalizing cultural gender beliefs related to *benevolent sexism* (Dardenne et al., 2007).

What happens when you are not as fortunate as these women and repeatedly experience stereotype threat? One likely consequence is that you will avoid and *disidentify* with whatever task is associated with the threatening scrutiny (Davies et al., 2005). For example, if the stereotype threat involves intellectual performance, you may change your self-concept so that academic achievement is no longer very important to your self-esteem. This sort of academic disidentification is much more common among African American students than among white American students, and it often begins in the lower elementary grades (Ambady et al., 2001; Osborne, 1995).

In one experiment investigating disidentification, Brenda Major and her coworkers (1998) manipulated success and failure feedback on a supposed test of intelligence. White students reacted with higher self-esteem after success than after failure, but black students' self-esteem was unaffected. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that black students tend to disengage their self-esteem from academic performance. A second experiment in this series found that, consistent with Steele's notion of stereotype

threat and begin monitoring what she says and how she says it in this course while simultaneously trying to suppress and deny her emotions so that others will not think less of her. All this constant self-regulation may eventually deplete her self-regulatory resources, causing problems even when she leaves the threatening environment of this course. She may begin overeating at meals, become overly sensitive to helpful criticism, and generally begin making less sound daily decisions. In the Applications section at the end of the chapter, we discuss possible ways to reduce the effects of stereotype threat in academic settings.

- There are three different categories of stigma: tribal identities, blemishes of individual character, and abominations of the body.
- Race-based cues automatically activate threat responses and negative stereotypes, which may contribute to shooter bias among law enforcement officers.
- Old-fashioned racism has declined; it has largely been replaced by aversive racism, which is a combination of both positive and negative beliefs and feelings about a racial group.
- Blacks' and other minority groups' racial attitudes toward whites originate primarily from perceptions of threat or conflict and as a reaction to white racism.
- Sexism is best conceptualized as involving *ambivalence*; it is based on both hostility and benevolence.
- Obesity is an example of both a “blemish of individual character” stigma and an “abomination of the body” stigma, and antifat prejudice permeates society.
- Homosexuality is an example of a “blemish of individual character” stigma, and it is related to the cultural ideology of heterosexism.
- Mental illness is another example of a “blemish of individual character” stigma, and the fear of being stigmatized is perhaps the leading reason sufferers avoid seeking help.
- Stigmatized groups can respond to negative stereotypes by experiencing stereotype threat.



Section Summary

6.3 WHAT SHAPES PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION?

Beyond the role that negative stereotypes (and other cultural beliefs and values) play in both the causes and effects of prejudice and discrimination, additional powerful motivational and social variables also exert a significant influence in the creation of intergroup intolerance (Gerstenfeld, 2002). In this section of the chapter we examine some of these causes, beginning with how group membership creates ingroup bias.

6.3a Ingroup Members Are Favored over Outgroup Members.

Have you ever gone to a campus social event and felt that students who were members of different campus groups than your own were evaluating you less positively simply because you were not “one of them”? Have you ever engaged in this sort of biased evaluation of

other students yourself? We have already discussed how social categorization sets the stage for perceiving members of other groups as having similar characteristics—and how such stereotyping can lead to intergroup intolerance. However, research by Henri Tajfel and his colleagues (1971) demonstrated that the simple act of categorizing people as ingroup or outgroup members affects how we evaluate and compare them, independent of stereotyping.

To test their hypothesis that group membership is often sufficient to foster ingroup favoritism, these researchers created what they called *minimal groups*, which are groups selected from a larger collection of people using some trivial—or minimal—criteria such as eye color, a random number table, or the flip of a coin. The people comprising these newly created groups were strangers to one another and were never given the opportunity to get acquainted. In some studies, participants were then individually taken into a room with the experimenter and asked how much money the other two participants should be paid for a subsequent task. These two people were identified only by code numbers, indicating to the participant that one came from his or her own group and the other was a member of the other group. Although participants knew only the others' membership statuses, they proceeded to reward the ingroup person more than the outgroup person (Tajfel et al., 1971).

Subsequent research on minimal groups replicated these findings, indicating that people often habitually engage in **ingroup bias** when evaluating others. That is, if they observe two people performing the same task, one of whom is a member of their ingroup, their evaluations of the two people's performance will be biased in favor of the ingroup member. This ingroup favoritism may manifest itself by people selectively remembering ingroup persons' good behaviors and outgroup members' bad behaviors, or by selectively forgetting or trivializing ingroup members' bad behaviors and outgroup members' good behaviors (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010). Such selective information processing causes an overestimation of ingroup performance relative to outgroup performance. Because of this ingroup bias, ingroup members are consistently rewarded more than outgroup members (Crisp et al., 2001; Reynolds et al., 2000).

Ingroup preference tends to be so automatically activated that simply using ingroup pronouns is often sufficient to arouse positive emotions, while using pronouns signifying outgroups can trigger negative emotions. Evidence for this effect comes from a series of studies conducted by Charles Perdue and his coworkers (1990), in which college students saw 108 seemingly randomly paired letter strings on a computer screen. Each pair of letter strings consisted of a nonsense syllable (*xeh*, *yof*, *laj*) presented with either an ingroup-designating pronoun (*we*, *us*, *ours*), an outgroup-designating pronoun (*they*, *them*, *theirs*), or, on the control trials, some other pronoun (*he*, *she*, *his*, *hers*). Students were told to quickly decide which letter string in each pair was a real word (*we-xeh*, *they-yof*).

Unbeknownst to the students, one nonsense syllable was consistently paired with ingroup pronouns and another with outgroup pronouns. After the trials, students were asked to rate each of the nonsense syllables in terms of its degree of pleasantness–unpleasantness. As you can see from Figure 6.7, students evaluated the nonsense words that had previously been paired with the ingroup pronouns as more pleasant than those paired either with outgroup pronouns or with the control pronouns. These results suggest that merely associating a previously neutral stimulus to words that designate



Have you ever gone to a social event and felt that others were evaluating you less positively simply because you were not part of their ingroup?
(Shutterstock)

ingroup bias

The tendency to give more favorable evaluations and greater rewards to ingroup members than to outgroup members

either ingroup or outgroup affiliations is sufficient to create biased emotional responses. As you might guess, ingroup biasing is often subtle and not recognized as being unfair by either the target or the perpetrator.

Not only do people evaluate ingroup members more positively than outgroup members, studies show that they are more likely to be “sensitive” to ingroup members’ emotions and feelings than to those of outgroup members (Chambon et al., 2008). Further, ingroup members tend to spontaneously prefer other ingroup members who are openly biased toward their ingroup—even when doing so violates egalitarian values (Castelli et al., 2008). Overall, people’s desire to place their ingroup higher than a comparison outgroup results in them more positively evaluating other ingroup members who enable the ingroup to be perceived as better than other groups (Castelli & Carraro, 2010).


Tajfel and John Turner, in their **social identity theory** (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Turner 1987), offered one of the most popular explanations for why ingroup biasing occurs. As you recall from Chapter 3 (p. 87), besides our personal identity, another important aspect of our self-concept is our social identity, which we derive from the groups to which we belong. Our social identity establishes *what* and *where* we are in social terms. Because our social identity forms a central aspect of our own self-definition, our self-esteem is partly determined by the social esteem of our ingroups.

social identity theory

A theory suggesting that people seek to enhance their self-esteem by identifying with specific social groups and perceiving these groups as being better than other groups

Figure 6.7 Us and Them: Ingroup Biasing

How pervasive is ingroup biasing? Perdue and colleagues (1990) found that nonsense words that had previously been paired with ingroup pronouns (e.g., *us*) were evaluated as more “pleasant” than nonsense words that had been paired with either outgroup pronouns (e.g., *them*) or control pronouns (e.g., *hers*). This study suggests that the ingroup-outgroup distinction has such emotional meaning to people that it can even shape their evaluation of unfamiliar words.



When our ingroups are successful—or even when members of our ingroups achieve some level of personal success—we can bask in their reflected glory. Consistent with several self-concept theories discussed in Chapter 3, social identity theory asserts that we are motivated to achieve or maintain a high level of self-esteem. Therefore, when the social esteem of our ingroup is threatened, we attempt to maintain a positive social identity by engaging in ingroup biasing—perceiving our ingroup as being better than other groups (Vanhoomissen & Overwalle, 2010). Research generally supports social identity theory.

Who is most likely to engage in more extreme forms of ingroup bias in order to heighten feelings of self-worth (Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Rowatt et al., 2005)? A number of studies indicate that people who engage in ingroup biasing experience an increase in self-esteem compared with those who are not given the opportunity to express this bias (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Also as expected, members of lower-status groups—whose social esteem, by definition, is perpetually low—tend to engage in more ingroup biasing than members of higher-status groups (Ellemers et al., 1997). Further, people who exhibit great pride in their ingroups and believe these groups are a central component of their own self-concept are more likely to engage in ingroup biasing than those who do not identify so strongly with their ingroups (Mohr & Fassinger, 2006; Verkuyten et al., 1999).

These findings are consistent with social identity theory, but additional research suggests that the people who are most likely to engage in prejudiced thinking as a means of enhancing or protecting self-esteem are those with defensive high self-esteem. As discussed in Chapter 3 (p. 100), individuals with high explicit self-esteem but low implicit self-esteem often lash out at others who threaten their fragile feelings of self-worth. Similarly, these same individuals are the ones who are particularly likely to engage in discrimination toward outgroups as a means of protecting threatened self-esteem (Jordan et al., 2005). Thus, social identity theory may best explain the prejudiced thinking of individuals who have relatively fragile feelings of high self-worth.



6.3b Intergroup Competition Can Lead to Prejudice.

If social identity theory has merit, what happens when we take this tendency (to perceive our ingroups as being better than other groups) and mix it with “hot” intergroup competition, where one group’s successes become the other group’s failures? Hostility and violence are common results. Numerous studies and real-world events inform us that when two groups compete for a limited number of scarce resources such as jobs, housing, consumer sales, or even food, tensions dramatically increase and create a breeding ground for prejudice (Duckitt & Mphuthing, 1998; Quillian, 1995).

Realistic Group Conflict Theory

Realistic group conflict theory focuses on examining the competitive roots of intergroup intolerance (Levine & Campbell, 1972). It argues that groups become prejudiced toward one another because they are in conflict due to competition for scarce resources. The group conflict is considered “rational” or “realistic” because it is based on real competition. Contemptuous prejudice and envious prejudice are often fed by the intergroup competition examined by this theory. According to realistic group conflict theory, some Americans’ hostility toward immigrants is escalating because of the perception that many immigrants are taking jobs away from American citizens and draining resources

realistic group conflict theory

The theory that intergroup conflict develops from competition for limited resources

from various social service agencies. Likewise, African Americans' hostility toward Asian Americans may increase if they believe that Asian shopkeepers in their neighborhoods are taking business opportunities away from them. Similarly, white Americans' prejudice toward African Americans may increase if blacks are hired ahead of whites due to affirmative action programs. On the international scene, Americans' anti-Arab attitudes have substantially increased following the September 11th terrorist attacks (Oswald, 2005).

Realistic group conflict theory contends that when groups are in conflict, two important changes occur in each group. The first change involves increased hostility toward the opposing outgroup, and the second change involves an intensification of ingroup loyalty. This pattern of behavior is referred to as **ethnocentrism** (Bizumic & Duckitt, 2012; Sumner, 1906). In an archival study of ethnocentrism, Taya Cohen and her colleagues (2006) analyzed data from 186 preindustrialized societies between 1850 and 1950 and found that as people's loyalty to their local communities increased, people valued outgroup violence more than ingroup violence, engaged in more external than internal warfare, and placed a higher value on external warfare. To better understand how ethnocentrism can develop due to conflict, let's examine a classic field study investigating this psychological phenomenon.

The Robbers Cave Study

What happens if you randomly place people into one of two groups and manipulate circumstances to promote intergroup competition? This was the central question surrounding a classic field study designed by Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif et al., 1961; Sherif & Sherif, 1956). They conducted the study in the summer of 1954 at a densely forested and hilly 200-acre camp that the researchers had created at Robbers Cave State Park, which is 150 miles southeast of Oklahoma City. Participants were 20 white, middle-class, well-adjusted, 11- and 12-year-old boys who had never met one another before. In advance, the researchers divided the boys into two groups, with one group leaving by bus for the camp a day before the other. Upon arrival, each group was assigned a separate cabin out of sight of the other, and thus, neither knew of the other's existence. The camp counselors were actually researchers who unobtrusively observed and recorded day-to-day camp events as the study progressed.

The study had three phases. The first phase was devoted to *creating ingroups*, the second was devoted to *instilling intergroup competition*, and the third phase involved *encouraging intergroup cooperation*. During the first week of ingroup creation, each group separately engaged in cooperative activities such as hiking, hunting for hidden treasures, making meals, and pitching tents. As the week progressed, each group developed its own leader and unique social identity. One group named itself the "Rattlers," established a tough-guy group norm, and spent a good deal of time cursing and swearing. The other group called itself the "Eagles," and they instituted a group norm forbidding profanity. As the first week drew to a close, each group became aware of the other's existence. How do you think they responded? By making clear and undeniable ingroup-outgroup statements: "*They better not be in our swimming hole!*" "*Those guys are using our baseball diamond again!*"

During the second phase of the study, Sherif tested his main hypothesis that intergroup competition would cause prejudice. To do this, he created a weeklong tournament between the two groups, consisting of 10 athletic events including things like baseball, football, and tug-of-war. The winner of each event would receive points, and at the end of the week the group with the most points would receive highly prized medals and impressive four-bladed pocketknives. True to Sherif's expectations, the intergroup conflict transformed these normal, well-adjusted boys into what a naive observer would have thought were "wicked, disturbed, and vicious" youngsters (Sherif, 1966, p. 58).

ethnocentrism

A pattern of increased hostility toward outgroups accompanied by increased loyalty to one's ingroup



Sherif and his colleagues (1961) created intergroup hostility between two groups of boys (the “Eagles” and the “Rattlers”) at a summer camp by having them compete against one another. In the photo on the left shown here, the Eagles grab and burn the Rattlers’ group flag after losing a tug-of-war contest. Later (right photo), the Rattlers hang an Eagle’s pair of jeans—upon which they have painted, “The Last of the Eagles”—from a pole. Can you recall incidents from your own life where competition with another group resulted in the development of prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory behavior?

(The Robbers Cave Experiment by Muzafer Sherif © 1988. Published by Wesleyan University Press and used by permission)

During this phase, the counselors heard a sharp increase in the number of unflattering names used to refer to outgroup members (for example, “pig” and “cheater”). The boys also rated their own group as being “brave,” “tough,” and “friendly,” while those in the outgroup were “sneaky,” “smart alecks,” and “stinkers.” This ingroup favoritism was also manifested in the boys’ friendship preferences. Sherif, playing the role of camp handyman, asked the boys to tell him who their friends were at camp. The sharp division between the two groups was reflected in the fact that 93% of the friendship preferences were of the ingroup variety. If negative attitudes previously existed between ingroup members, they were now redirected against the outgroup. These findings indicate that one by-product of intergroup hostility is an increase in ingroup solidarity.

As the two groups competed in the various games, intergroup hostility quickly escalated from name calling to acts of physical aggression. For example, at the end of the first tug-of-war contest, the losing Eagles demonstrated their outgroup attitudes by seizing and burning the Rattlers’ group flag. Not to be outdone, the Rattlers raided the Eagles’ cabin, overturning cots, ripping mosquito netting, and carrying off one of the Eagles’ blue jeans as booty. The next day, armed with bats and sticks, the Eagles returned the favor. Then they retreated to their cabin, proceeded to stuff rocks in their socks, and waited for the next wave of Rattler reprisals.

Who ultimately won the valued prizes for which they were competing? The Eagles. Not surprisingly, the Rattlers thought they had been cheated. While the victors were taking a celebratory swim, the Rattlers stole their medals and knives. When the Eagles returned to find their prizes gone, the Rattlers admitted to the deed and told the incensed Eagles they could have them back ... if they got down on their bellies and crawled for them! These are only a few of the incidents that occurred between the Eagles and the Rattlers. Intergroup hostility became so intense that members of the opposing groups held their noses whenever they passed by one another in camp.

This second phase of the study illustrates how easily hostility can develop between groups when they are brought into competition. The third phase of the study was designed to reverse the hostility, a task that proved to be much more difficult to accomplish. First, the researchers sought to determine whether simple noncompetitive contact between

the groups would ease tensions. They tested this hypothesis during the first two days of phase three by bringing the groups together for some pleasant activity, such as a meal or a movie. The results were not encouraging. Both groups used each interaction merely as an opportunity to increase their mutual animosity for one another. During mealtimes, for example, food was more likely to be thrown at opposing group members than eaten.

The failure of simple contact to reduce hostility did not surprise Sherif and his colleagues. They hypothesized that to reduce intergroup conflict, they needed to introduce what they called a **superordinate goal**, which is a mutually shared goal that can be achieved only through intergroup cooperation. To test this hypothesis, the researchers arranged for a series of problem situations to develop over the course of the next 6 days. Each problem was urgent and involved both groups. The first problem was the “failure” of the camp’s water supply. The groups initially responded to this emergency by trying to solve it on their own, without the other group’s assistance. However, after converging on the source of the water problem—the camp water tank’s plugged faucet—they cooperated in fixing it.

A few days later, the camp truck “broke down” while the two groups were on an overnight camping excursion; all the boys had to work together to pull it up a steep hill. Following this incident of cooperation, name calling and negative outgroup stereotypes declined. Sherif, still in his guise as the camp handyman, again asked the boys who their friends were. Now, outgroup friendships had grown from a measly 7% average at the end of phase one to a rather robust 30% average—a significant increase in outgroup liking. In keeping with this newfound outgroup appreciation, at their final campfire the two groups decided to put on a joint entertainment program consisting of skits and songs. When departing from camp the following day, the two groups insisted on traveling home on the same bus. On the way home, the Rattlers used money they had won in their previous competitions with the Eagles to buy milkshakes for everyone.

Taken as a whole, the Robbers Cave study is an excellent example of how ethnocentrism can develop when two groups compete for scarce resources. It also demonstrates that having a superordinate goal can lead to peaceful coexistence between previously antagonistic groups. Although this study used children as participants, similar results have also been obtained with adult samples (Jackson, 1993).

Despite the fact that the original theory assumed that prejudice develops due to real, tangible conflict between groups, later work demonstrated that the mere *perception* of conflict is often sufficient to fuel intolerance (Esses et al., 1998). For example, Michael Zárate and his colleagues (2004) found that when American research participants were led to believe that Mexican immigrants had similar skills and attributes as themselves, their sense of job security was threatened, which led to more negative attitudes toward immigrants. These findings suggest that when members of two groups share some important job-related skills, they may begin to view the other group as their rival—even where no actual rivalry exists. This is an important extension of realistic group conflict theory; and it also illustrates how attributing positive characteristics to a group—Americans perceiving Mexican immigrants as having useful skills—can trigger intergroup prejudice.

6.3c Prejudice Can Serve as a Justification for Oppression.

What if two groups come into contact with one another, but one group is much more powerful than the other? In laboratory experiments, when groups are given different amounts of social power, members of high-power groups discriminate more against outgroups than members of low-power groups (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1987, 1991). Additional research suggests that having social power increases automatic negative evaluations of stigmatized groups and increases the experience of negative affect when

superordinate goal

A mutually shared goal that can be achieved only through intergroup cooperation

encountering stigmatized group members (Guinote et al., 2010). What sort of beliefs might foster and justify these automatically activated negative feelings that often lead to discrimination?

Social Dominance Theory

Social dominance theory proposes that in all societies, groups can be organized in a hierarchy of power with at least one group being dominant over all others (Pratto, 1996). Dominant groups enjoy a lopsided share of the society's assets, such as wealth, prestige, education, and health. In contrast, subordinate groups receive most of the society's liabilities, such as poverty, social stigma, illiteracy, poor health, and high levels of criminal punishment. History teaches us that the negative stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes that dominant groups develop about those they oppress serve to justify their continued oppression (Frederico & Sidanius, 2002; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Contemptuous prejudice and paternalistic prejudice are the two forms of intolerance expressed by the oppressor group, while the prejudice that subordinate groups express toward those who oppress them is of the envious form.

A good deal of the prejudice that has occurred in the history of the United States has rested on social dominance. The Europeans who founded this country did not arrive on uninhabited shores in the "New World." These settlers used their superior weapons to dominate and conquer the indigenous people of North America. At the same time that Europeans were colonizing North America, they were also capturing and buying Africans and transporting them to the colonies as slaves. They justified this inhuman exploitation by stigmatizing both American Indians and Africans as inferior races who needed civilizing.

Consistent with social dominance theory, research indicates that people develop less egalitarian beliefs toward outgroups as the social status of their own group increases in comparison to the target outgroups (Levin, 2004; Schmitt et al., 2003). A number of experimental studies have also demonstrated that developing prejudicial and stigmatizing attitudes toward the victims of one's own harmful actions is a common response (Georgeson & Harris, 2000; Rodriguez-Bailon et al., 2000). For example, Stephen Worchel and Virginia Mathie Andreoli (1978) found that, when instructed to deliver electric shocks to a man when he responded incorrectly on a learning task, college students were more likely to dehumanize him than were students who were instructed to reward the man for correct answers. By dehumanizing and derogating their own victims, powerful exploiters can not only avoid thinking of themselves as villains but can also justify further exploitation (Quist & Resendez, 2002).

Old American textbooks illustrate the racist attitudes generated from such exploitation. For example, Figure 6.8 is an excerpt from a popular high school geography book published in 1880 devoted to the "Races of Man" around the globe. The five listed races are classified in a descending order of capacity for civilization—the *Caucasian* races,



The European settlers used their superior weapons to conquer the indigenous people of North America. How does social dominance theory explain the Europeans' subsequent treatment of American Indian tribes?
(Wikimedia Commons)

"The Whites told only one side. Told it to please themselves. Told much that is not true. Only his own best deeds, only the worst deeds of the Indians, has the White man told."

— Yellow Wolf, Nez Perce Indian, 1855–1935

social dominance theory

A theory contending that societal groups can be organized in a power hierarchy in which the dominant groups enjoy a disproportionate share of the society's assets and the subordinate groups receive most of its liabilities

the *Yellow* race, the *Negro* type, the *Malays*, and the *Indians*. Can you guess the race of the author of this civilized hierarchy? The white American author describes the two races that his social group has had the most contact with, and whom they had historically treated so harshly, in a particularly interesting way. African tribes are described as living in a “savage or barbarous state,” while the American descendants of native Africans are described as having “been Christianized and civilized” by whites. What about the representatives of the native races of America, whose land had been taken by the Europeans from whom the author likely descended? According to the author,

“We first crush people to the earth, and then claim the right of trampling on them forever, because they are prostrate.”

—Lydia Maria Child, U.S. author and abolitionist, 1802–1880

American Indians “have always shown but little capacity for civilization” (Swinton, 1880, p. 17). In these characterizations, we see how an oppressor group justifies its exploitation of less powerful groups by denigrating them.

Of course, not all members of dominant groups denigrate those below them in the status hierarchy. People differ in the degree to which they perceive their social world as a competitive jungle with “haves” and “have-nots” fighting to gain or maintain supremacy over each other. Individuals with a strong *social dominance orientation* desire and support the organization of societal groups in a status hierarchy, with designated “inferior” groups being dominated by designated “superior” groups (Bassett, 2010; Costello & Hodson, 2011). Research suggests that this motivation—to view the world in terms of a status hierarchy dominated by the powerful—causes people to adopt belief systems and to seek out membership in groups that promote prejudice and social inequality (Dambrun et al., 2002; Guimond et al., 2003).

System Justification Theory

How do members of disadvantaged groups respond to this unequal distribution of societal resources? A number of studies find that, while members of disadvantaged groups readily acknowledge that their group is frequently targeted for prejudice and discrimination, they tend to minimize the extent to which they have personally experienced discrimination in their jobs and daily lives. This tendency for members of disadvantaged groups to downplay personal discrimination in their own lives is known as the **personal-group discrimination discrepancy** (Taylor et al., 1990).

Why might people often fail to appreciate the degree to which they are the victims of discrimination? One reason is that admitting that you have been the victim of discrimination would challenge your belief that you have control over your life, which would, in turn, weaken your confidence that you can obtain your personal goals (Sechrist et al., 2004). Thus, denying personal discrimination allows you to maintain the belief that you personally control what happens to you. A second reason for denying personal discrimination is that you may want to distance yourself from the negative attributes stereotypically assigned to your fellow ingroup members (Hodson & Esses, 2002). Underlying this type of thinking is an acknowledgment that there is at least some legitimacy to the discrimination directed at your ingroup while at the same time denying that you personally possess the objectionable attributes.

One of the consequences of failing to realize that you have been the victim of discrimination is that such denial increases the likelihood that the existing unfair status hierarchy in society will remain intact. **System justification theory** contends that members of disadvantaged groups often endorse the group status hierarchy in society as being legitimate and fair. Unfortunately, this endorsement of the existing status quo often serves as a stumbling block to disadvantaged individuals’ own personal and social advancement (Jost et al., 2007; Osborne & Sibley, 2013).

personal-group discrimination discrepancy

The tendency for members of disadvantaged groups to downplay personal discrimination in their own lives

system justification theory

A theory proposing that members of disadvantaged groups often adopt beliefs endorsing the legitimacy and fairness of the unequal group status hierarchy in society

Figure 6.8 An Example of Racist Attitudes in an Old American Textbook

The characterizations of the various races in Swinton's (1880) text convey the ingroup biases of the author. In comparing our own beliefs to the beliefs of this author of the 19th century—before we smugly assume a superior attitude of intergroup tolerance—we must ask ourselves how our current attitudes and beliefs toward different social groups will be judged by future generations. What sort of overlooked ingroup prejudices and biases permeate the text you are reading at this very moment? As the author, I am sure my ingroup biases have occasionally made their way into my writing. How can becoming aware of our current prejudices steer us toward nonprejudiced thinking?

RACES OF MEN. 17

SECTION III.—POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY.

TOPIC I.

RACES OF MEN.


I. ORAL OUTLINE.

1. Have you ever seen an Indian? Can you always tell an Indian from a white man? You can; then it must be because the Indian has some natural marks that distinguish him from a white man. What is one of these marks? Red or copper complexion. Yes. Another? Long, straight black hair. Yes. Another? Another? These natural marks are called *physical characteristics*.


2. Have you ever seen a Chinaman?—a Japanese? What was his complexion? Hence we may call the Chinese and Japanese the Yellow Race. They are also called Mongolians. Many peoples of Asia belong to this race. How do the eyes of a Mongolian differ from those of an American? Do the Chinese wear beards? Now give a connected statement of the physical characteristics of the Mongolian race. [In like manner let the teacher draw from the pupils what they know about the other races.]

II. FOR RECITATION.


1. The races are classified according to five types,—the Caucasian, Mongolian, Negro or African, Malay, and Indian types.




2. The Caucasian Races are represented by the peoples of Europe and their descendants in America and elsewhere. To this type belong also the Arabs and Hindoos. The Caucasians have generally a fair complexion (though some representatives are swarthy), regular features, soft flowing hair, and full beards. They are the leaders in the world's civilization.




woolly hair, broad flat nose, and thick lips. Most of the African tribes are in a savage or barbarous state. Several millions of colored people in the United States (descendants of native Africans) have been Christianized and civilized.




3. The Yellow Race is spread over Central and Eastern Asia (examples: China, Japan, Tartary), and includes the sparse population of the Arctic regions on both continents. The Mongolians have an olive-yellow complexion, straight black hair, broad countenance, high cheek-bones, and eyes set obliquely. In civilization they rank next to the Caucasians.



5. The Malays are found in the Malayan Peninsula, and in many of the islands of the Pacific Ocean. They have a brown complexion and features considerably resembling those of the Chinese, but they have generally straight-set eyes.



4. The Negro Type is spread over most of Africa, where it is represented by various tribes. These differ in many respects, but are all alike in having a dark or black complexion, short crisp



6. The Indians are the representatives of the native races of America. They have a copper-colored complexion, rather regular features, straight black hair, and scanty beard. They have always shown but little capacity for civilization.

REFERENCE TABLE OF RACES.

Race.	Physical Characteristics.	Representative Types.	Numbers.
Caucasian.	COLOR: white to swarthy. FEATURES: regular. HAIR: waving or curling. BEARD: heavy.	Leading European peoples — descendants of European colonists — Hindoos, Arabs.	600 millions.
Mongolian	COLOR: olive-yellow. FEATURES: face broad and flat, with high cheek-bones, and small, black, obliquely set eyes. HAIR: coarse and stiff. BEARD: scanty.	Chinese—Japanese—Tartars — Turks — Esquimaux.	550 millions.
African....	COLOR: brown to black. FEATURES: flat nose, retreating forehead, prominent jaws. HAIR: short and crisp. BEARD: scanty.	Tribes of Central Africa — their descendants in America.	180 millions.
Malay.....	COLOR: brown. FEATURES: much like Mongolians, but with horizontally set eyes.	Inhabitants of Malacca, of East India Islands, and most of the isles of the Pacific.	60 millions.
Indian.....	COLOR: red, or copper-hue. FEATURES: high cheek-bones, prominent nose, and black eyes. HAIR: straight and black. BEARD: scanty.	Indian tribes in North and South America.	10 millions.

Societal stereotypes play an important role in system justification because they justify the positive outcomes of dominant groups, the negative outcomes of subordinate groups, and the exploitation of subordinate groups by dominant groups (Jost et al., 2005). For example, women are often rewarded and encouraged to conform to the feminine gender role by presenting themselves as “nice, but weak” (Rudman, 2005). Women who adopt this benevolently sexist self-presentation style receive positive reinforcement for being warm and nurturing, but they also are perceived as being less competent and powerful (Jackman, 1994). Despite these negative consequences, by focusing on the rewards of this subordinate role women tend to develop an automatic preference for male over female authority, which perpetuates the existing status quo and short-circuits any collective action to reduce gender inequality (Becker & Wright, 2011).

Similar system justification is observed among the social classes. Throughout literature, film, and popular culture, poor people are often stereotyped as being happier and more honest than rich people, and also as being more likely to be rewarded in the afterlife. According to system justification theory, by reinforcing the idea that the material advantages of the rich are offset by the nonmaterial advantages of the poor, an illusory belief is maintained that overall benefits in society balance out, and that the status hierarchy is therefore fair and justifiable.

In support of this hypothesis, Aaron Kay and John Jost (2003) found that, when people read stories about characters who matched societal stereotypes of rich and poor, they were more likely than those not exposed to such stereotyped characters to later believe that the status hierarchy in society is fair and equitable. Although believing that existing social arrangements are generally desirable may reduce personal distress and lead to greater satisfaction among those at the lower end of the status hierarchy, it also breeds inaction (Kay et al., 2007). If moral outrage is one of the primary motivators of social reform and efforts to help the disadvantaged, then system justification effectively defuses the emotional component that would trigger such social action (Wakslak et al., 2007).

6.3d Authoritarianism Is Associated with Hostility Toward Outgroups.

One of the early inquiries into prejudice-prone personalities was the work of Theodor Adorno and Else Frenkel-Brunswik—two social scientists who fled Nazi Germany during World War II. Motivated by a desire to explain the psychology underlying the mass genocide of millions of Jews and other “undesirables” by the Nazi regime, Adorno and Frenkel-Brunswik set out to discover how people with certain personality characteristics might be prone to intergroup hostility.

Along with their colleagues at the University of California at Berkeley, Adorno and Frenkel-Brunswik believed that the cause of extreme prejudice could be traced to personality conflicts developed during childhood (Adorno et al., 1950). Operating from a psychoanalytic perspective and using survey, case study, and interview methods, they identified what they called the **authoritarian personality**. Based on their studies, the researchers concluded that authoritarians are submissive to authority figures and intolerant of those who are weak or different. The intergroup hostility they express toward lower-status groups generally takes the form of contemptuous prejudice. Authoritarians also conform rigidly to cultural values and believe that morality is a matter of clear right and wrong choices.

authoritarian personality

A personality type characterized by submissiveness to authority, rigid adherence to conventional values, and prejudice toward outgroups


The Berkeley researchers believed that authoritarian personalities resulted from harsh child-rearing practices that taught children to *repress* their hostility toward authority, instead redirecting or *displacing* it onto less powerful targets who could not retaliate. Although this original theory is acknowledged as an important attempt to understand prejudice in terms of personality conflict and child-rearing practices, questions about how people actually become authoritarians and criticisms of the Berkeley scientists' research methods resulted in this approach losing credibility by the late 1960s (Hiel et al., 2004).

In the 1980s, interest in the authoritarian personality was revived when Bob Altemeyer (1981, 1988) suggested that its origins have nothing to do with personality conflicts from childhood; instead, he proposed, it is caused by children learning a prejudicial style of thinking from their parents and other important people in their lives. Operating from a social learning perspective, Altemeyer contended that children who are socialized by authoritarians and strict disciplinarians develop similar tendencies because they model and reinforce this intolerant worldview. He further asserted that most of this social learning occurs during adolescence, with the principal modelers being parents and peers. Socialized to view their world as a dangerous and threatening place, and isolated from personal contact with nonconventional people or minorities, adolescents in authoritarian environments learn that it is acceptable and even encouraged to express hostility toward various outgroups.

A number of studies conducted over the past 20 years support Altemeyer's social learning view over the earlier psychoanalytic perspective (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). What appears to motivate the prejudice of the authoritarian personality is not repressed parental conflict; rather, it is a strong desire to identify with, and conform to, the existing social order, coupled with a learned sense of fearfulness and insecurity about the social world and a perception that other groups pose a threat to one's ingroup (Altemeyer, 2004; Jost et al., 2003). Individuals growing up in authoritarian households are most likely to adopt authoritarian attitudes and beliefs when they have strong needs for social order and conformity.

In many different societies, people with authoritarian personalities not only express greater antipathy toward threatening outgroups than the average person but are also more likely to act on their hostility (Lippa & Arad, 1999). Authoritarians also tend to generalize their outgroup prejudices. For example, if they hate blacks, they are also likely to express hostility toward Jews, feminists, gay men and lesbians, the homeless, and people with AIDS (Pek & Leong, 2003). Authoritarians' distaste for threatening outgroups is also reflected in greater support for their government's military actions against other countries during times of international tension. They not only support such actions but are also more likely to excuse atrocities committed by their own military forces during these interventions (Doty et al., 1997; Unger, 2002).

Besides identifying individual variations in authoritarianism, social scientists have also examined how it might vary on a societal level over time. An important catalyst for the manifestation of societal authoritarianism is *perceived social threat* (Doty et al., 1991). That is, when societies undergo economic hardships and social upheaval, mildly authoritarian individuals may become motivated to join social, political, or religious organizations that



The widespread abuse of Iraqi detainees by U.S. occupying forces in Abu Ghraib prison was widely condemned. Which type of person is more likely to excuse such prisoner abuse: an individual with an authoritarian personality, or someone with a high social dominance orientation?
(AP World Wide Photo)

TH CRITICAL N K I N G



The terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 greatly increased Americans' perceived social threat. Based on authoritarianism research, what type of social consequences might we see in this country due to this heightened threat? Further, how might this same research explain the mind-set and behavior of the terrorists?

express dogmatic and rigid social attitudes and preach intolerance of outgroups who are perceived as threats to the social order (McCann, 1999). For example, in a series of archival studies of church membership patterns in the United States, Stuart McCann (1999) found that people were most attracted to intolerant religious teachings and authoritarian churches when the country was experiencing heightened social and economic threat. Similarly, longitudinal studies of South Koreans' social values between 1982 and 1996 found that as economic and military threats diminished, endorsement of authoritarian beliefs also diminished among the young and the educated portions of the population (Lee, 2003).

A Dual-Process Model of Personality-Influenced Prejudice

One of the more recent developments in the search for personality-influenced explanations of prejudice is John Duckitt's (2001, 2005) contention that the individual difference characteristics of authori-

itarianism and social dominance orientation are more correctly identified as social attitudes and that they account for different types of outgroup prejudice. In explaining how these two social attitudes shape people's social-world beliefs and perceptions of outgroups, Duckitt developed a *dual-process model* in which he asserts that underlying authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are two different personality traits: social conformity and tough-mindedness.


As depicted in Figure 6.9, in explaining the origins of the authoritarian personality, Duckitt asserts that individuals who are socialized by strict and punitive disciplinarians develop a strong need to conform to authority figures and social conventions. Because this desire for conformity is associated with the existing social order, these individuals develop a sensitivity to anything that might threaten this order. Thus, they tend to view the diversity in their social world as being dangerous and threatening. Motivated by social conformity and having threatening worldview beliefs, strong authoritarians develop prejudice toward outgroups they perceive as threatening their existing social order.

Regarding the development of a strong social dominance orientation, Duckitt proposes that people who are socialized in a cold and unaffectionate manner develop a tough-minded personality, in which they view the world as a ruthlessly competitive jungle where the strong win and the weak lose. In turn, this worldview activates a desire for group power, dominance, and superiority over others and a disdain for those who are weak or of low social status. The prejudices of people with a strong social dominance orientation are not triggered by perceptions that outgroups threaten social conventions and norms, but instead by perceptions that outgroups are weak or pose a threat to their own group's social status.

This dual-process model of personality-based prejudices has received considerable support in many studies over the past decade (e.g., Dru, 2007; Perry et al., 2013; Shaffer & Duckitt, 2013; Sibley et al., 2013). For example, in a study of disliked groups, Duckitt and Chris Sibley (2007) found that prejudicial attitudes toward groups perceived as dangerous are related only to authoritarianism, while prejudicial attitudes toward groups perceived as inferior were related only to social dominance orientation. Similarly, a survey study of Americans' support for the Iraq War one week before the 2003 invasion found that individual differences in authoritarianism and social dominance predicted different sets of

Figure 6.9 A Dual-Process Model of Personality-Influenced Prejudice

John Duckitt (2005) proposes that authoritarianism and social dominance orientation are shaped by different socialization and personality forces, resulting in different expressions of prejudice. Children raised by strict and punitive parents (Step 1) develop a strong need for social conformity (Step 2), and this sensitivity to authority and social conventions causes them to perceive their diverse social world as a threatening place (Step 3). Their resulting authoritarian social attitudes (Step 4) lead them to develop prejudice toward outgroups perceived as threatening to their social order (Step 5). In contrast, children raised in a cold and unaffectionate household (Step 1) develop a tough-minded personality (Step 2), which leads them to develop beliefs that their social world is ruthless and competitive (Step 3). This worldview activates a desire for group power and social dominance (Step 4), which causes them to develop prejudice toward low social status outgroups (Step 5).



beliefs about the war (McFarland, 2005). High authoritarianism—but not social dominance orientation—intensified Americans' belief that Iraq posed a threat to the United States. High social dominance orientation—but not authoritarianism—intensified support for the attack by reducing concern for the loss of life that the war would almost certainly produce. Together, these findings support the dual-process model's hypothesis that high authoritarians' tendency to perceive the world as a threatening place triggers outgroup hostility, while high social dominance individuals' callousness and lack of empathy underlies their prejudice toward outgroups. Thus, by emphasizing different socialization and personality forces in the shaping of different forms of prejudice, this dual-process model provides a broader and more comprehensive understanding of the causes and dynamics of intergroup intolerance.

"It's always a simple matter to drag the people along whether it's a democracy, a fascist dictatorship, a parliament, or a communist dictatorship. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism, and exposing the country to great danger."

—Hermann Göring, Hitler's commander of Nazi stormtroopers, 1893–1946



Section Summary

- People appear to be automatically biased toward ingroup members.
- Social identity theory asserts that prejudice and discrimination can result from people trying to increase or maintain self-esteem.
- Realistic group conflict theory argues that groups become prejudiced toward one another because they are in competition for scarce resources.
- Social dominance theory explains how dominant groups develop stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes to justify their oppression of others.
- System justification theory explains how disadvantaged groups endorse oppressive societal beliefs.
- Research on authoritarianism suggests that some forms of prejudice can be traced to personality and socialization factors.

6.4 CAN WE REDUCE INTERGROUP BIAS AND INTOLERANCE?

Having analyzed the psychological and social mechanisms underlying intergroup bias and intolerance, let us now explore the prospects for reducing prejudice and discrimination. First, we examine whether changing people's thinking can reduce prejudice (an *individual-based approach*), and then we outline situational factors necessary to reduce intergroup intolerance (a *group-based approach*). Finally, the chapter ends with a brief look at social psychological attempts to remedy some of the negative consequences of prejudice and discrimination in our educational system.

6.4a Prejudice and Discrimination Can Be Reduced by Monitoring Stereotyped Thinking.

Although thinking in terms of stereotypes may often be an automatic process—sometimes even a socially beneficial one—there are also negative consequences to unmonitored stereotypical thinking. As we have already discussed, many stereotypes about various outgroups contain unflattering and demeaning characteristics. When they become activated, they can result in harmful biasing effects toward outgroup members who possess none of the objectionable qualities ascribed to their group. Given the fact that stereotypes are resistant to change, how can motivated individuals avoid judging others in this manner?

Patricia Devine and Margo Monteith contend that people can circumvent stereotypical thinking if they make a conscious effort to use more rational, inductive strategies (Devine & Sharp, 2009; Monteith & Mark, 2009). That is, even though individuals may have *knowledge* of a stereotype and may have relied on it in the past to make social judgments, their current *personal beliefs* may no longer be in agreement with the stereotype. Due to this change in circumstances, instead of making judgments based on the stereotype, they may now consciously decide to rely on their own personal beliefs (Monteith et al., 2002).

For example, imagine that Clayton has grown up being taught that women are intellectually inferior to men. However, during the course of his life, Clayton has been exposed to people who do not fit this gender stereotype. Because of these experiences—as well as his desire to perceive himself as nonsexist—Clayton may begin to adopt a more egalitarian view of women. Although Clayton no longer accepts the stereotype, he has

not eliminated it from his memory. Quite the contrary. During his relearning process, this stereotype remains a well-organized, frequently activated cognitive structure, and it is more accessible than his newly adopted personal beliefs. In fact, Clayton's unwanted stereotype will be on his mind most precisely when he is with women and feeling most anxious about saying the wrong thing (Lambert et al., 2003).

In a very real sense, for a person like Clayton, censoring the negative stereotype and guarding against ingroup biasing takes conscious and deliberate attention—like trying to break a bad habit. As you may recall from Chapter 5 (p. 186), habits involve a good number of automatic and unthinking responses; because of this, they are often difficult to break. In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4 (pp. 126–128), attempting to suppress particular thoughts—such as stereotypes—can actually cause these thoughts to flood our consciousness, which is referred to as the *rebound effect* (Follenfant & Ric, 2010; Geeraert, 2012). Returning to Clayton, although the unwanted stereotype will likely be automatically activated as soon as he encounters a woman, the good news is that this stereotype is likely to become deactivated the longer the interaction continues (Kunda et al., 2002). This suggests that cognitively guarding against unwanted stereotypes is most important during the initial phases of an encounter with a person from the stereotyped group. Additional research further suggests that the likelihood of rebound effects due to stereotype suppression is much lower among people who are relatively unprejudiced, compared to highly prejudiced individuals who suppress in order to avoid social disapproval (Wyer, 2007).

Figure 6.10 outlines how self-awareness and self-regulation (see Chapter 3) may play a role in reducing prejudiced responses. Continuing with our example, whenever Clayton encounters a woman, the gender stereotype is involuntarily activated. If he does not consciously monitor his thoughts, he may automatically slip back into acting as though women are the intellectual inferiors of men (a *discrepant response*). Becoming aware of this discrepancy in his actions, Clayton will experience *discrepancy-associated consequences*. These include feelings of guilt and self-criticism that will, in turn, motivate him to heighten his self-awareness and search for situational cues that may have spontaneously triggered this prejudiced response (Hing et al., 2002). Through such attentiveness to prejudice-triggering cues, Clayton will slowly build up self-regulatory mechanisms that should produce more controlled and careful responses on future occasions (Kawakami et al., 2000).


The importance of Devine and Monteith's perspective for reducing prejudice and discrimination is that it does not assume that prejudice is an inevitable consequence of the natural process of social categorization. People can avoid prejudiced responding (that is, discrimination) if low-prejudiced standards are central to their self-concept *and* they bring these standards to mind before acting. Thus, although automatic stereotype activation makes nonprejudiced responding difficult, research indicates that people can inhibit such intolerance through conscious and deliberate self-regulation (Legault et al., 2007).

The biggest stumbling block in unlearning prejudicial responding is that, as we discovered in Chapter 3 (pp. 72), many people do not spontaneously engage in the self-awareness necessary to think about their own personal nonprejudiced standards (Monteith, 1996). If they do not think about these standards, there will be no guilt and internal conflict when they respond in a prejudicial manner. If people do engage in self-awareness, they can learn to avoid using stereotypes in their social judgments (Kawakami et al., 2000).

A further implication of Devine and Monteith's perspective is that it draws some necessary boundaries around the pervasiveness of aversive racism among white Americans (refer back to pp. 227–229); not all whites are desperately trying to hide their racial prejudices from themselves and others. Indeed, this perspective contends that many people—regardless of their race, sex, or sexual orientation—are motivated and consciously attempt to develop nonprejudicial thinking. Although it is not easy, and although it will undoubtedly

Figure 6.10 Reducing Prejudiced Responding Through Self-Regulation

According to Devine and Monteith, when low-prejudiced persons first begin to try to respond in a nonprejudiced manner toward previously denigrated outgroup members, stereotype activation often spontaneously triggers a discrepant (i.e., prejudiced) response, which subsequently triggers a series of discrepancy-associated consequences. This cognitive process is depicted by the arrows running vertically from top to bottom in the left side of the figure. Over time, through careful self-regulation of one's thoughts and attention to one's nonprejudiced standards, low-prejudiced people break the "prejudice habit" and respond as depicted by the horizontal arrows at the top of the figure. If this model accurately describes how prejudiced behavior can be eliminated, what would be the first step you would need to take to reduce your own prejudiced responding?



induce instances of guilt and self-criticism, with conscious effort, prejudicial thinking can be reduced if you internalize egalitarian values and norms into your self-concept.

This perspective also holds out hope for reducing prejudice even among aversive racists. The cognitive hurdle here is that, unlike people who recognize that they sometimes engage in prejudiced thinking, aversive racists are convinced they are nonprejudiced, so they believe there is no need to monitor their thoughts for bias. How can their prejudiced thinking be reduced without them engaging in careful self-regulation? The answer is that someone else must point out to aversive racists the inconsistencies between their explicit and implicit attitudes—at least initially. Research by Leanne Son Hing and her coworkers (2002) indicates that when aversive racists are confronted with evidence exposing their hidden biases, they tend to experience guilt and make conscious efforts to behave in a

nonprejudiced manner. In essence, other people are playing the self-regulatory role for aversive racists, raising their consciousness and prompting them to reduce their prejudicial thinking and behavior.

6.4b Targets of Prejudice Can Become Agents of Positive Social Change.

Thus far our discussion has focused on how prejudiced individuals can reduce their own biased thinking and responding, but those who are the targets of prejudice and discrimination can become powerful agents of social change themselves. For example, imagine that you are the only African American student in a college class. When the professor instructs everyone to break into small groups to do a project, the nonblack students around you act awkwardly. It appears that they don't want you in their group. What would you do? Or imagine that you are a lesbian student in a class and someone blurts out "That's so gay!" to express a negative opinion of another student's comments. What would you do?

A number of studies find that individuals who are the targets of negative stereotyping and prejudice report that they often want to respond by assertively communicating their displeasure to the perpetrator, but that they do not always act on this desire (Swim et al., 1998). This strategy of "breaking the silence" is consistent with current activist norms that have replaced old-fashioned norms of social deference in the United States (Swim et al., 2003). One important social benefit of assertively responding is that it provides the opportunity to educate perpetrators by raising their awareness and hopefully reducing their prejudice (Zitek & Hebl, 2007). An additional personal benefit is that an assertive response often reduces negative feelings aroused by the perpetrators' comments (Hyers, 2007).

While assertively responding may be beneficial on both personal and social levels, survey studies find that targets of negative stereotyping and prejudice sometimes decide to remain silent (Foster, 1999; Wright et al., 1990). The most common reason for not assertively responding to others' biased thinking is a concern about being judged negatively (Dodd et al., 2001). Assertive confrontations risk confirming stereotypes that your group is "difficult," "aggressive," or "oversensitive" when interacting with outgroup members (Latting, 1993). A related reason for not assertively responding is a desire to avoid conflict. Yet one negative personal consequence of not assertively responding to prejudice is that targets report that they carry negative feelings with them afterward (Hyers, 2007). In reviewing this research, it must be acknowledged that the types of positive social change necessary to reduce intergroup intolerance cannot occur through face-to-face confrontations alone. Yet when the targets of prejudice actively try to redefine their social world through these interpersonal confrontations, they are nurturing the seeds of social change that might otherwise lie dormant.

"If we accept and acquiesce in the face of discrimination, we accept the responsibility ourselves and allow those responsible to salve their conscience by believing that they have our acceptance and concurrence. ... We should, therefore, protest openly everything ... that smacks of discrimination."

—Mary McLeod Bethune, U.S. educator and civil rights activist, 1875–1955

6.4c The Contact Hypothesis Identifies Social Conditions That Reduce Intergroup Conflict.

At the time of the original U.S. Supreme Court *Brown v. Board of Education* decision on school desegregation, Gordon Allport (1954) outlined how desegregation might reduce racial prejudice. Later, other social psychologists also contributed to what came to be

known as the **contact hypothesis** (Amir, 1969; Hewstone, 1996). The contact hypothesis can be thought of as a blueprint for reducing hostility by manipulating situational variables between groups that have had a history of conflict. According to this perspective, intergroup contact will decrease hostility when specific situational conditions are met (refer to Table 6.3).

Table 6.3 Reducing Prejudice Through Social Contact

According to the contact hypothesis, intergroup prejudice can be reduced if the four conditions listed below are met. Does research indicate that all four conditions are essential for prejudice reduction to occur?

Four Situational Conditions
1. <i>Equal Social Status</i> : Members of groups in conflict should interact in settings where everyone has roughly equal status.
2. <i>Sustained Close Contact</i> : Interaction between members of different groups should be one-on-one and should be maintained over an extended period of time.
3. <i>Intergroup Cooperation</i> : Members of different groups should engage in joint activities to achieve superordinate goals.
4. <i>Social Norms Favoring Equality</i> : There must be a clear social perception, largely fostered by group authority figures, that prejudice and discrimination are not condoned.
Fifth Condition in the Reformulated Model
Friendship Potential: Developing friendships with outgroup members precipitates initial reductions in intergroup tensions and fosters emotional ties that are important in reducing prejudice over time.

Equal Social Status

The first necessary condition is that the groups interacting must be roughly *equal in social status*. When this condition is not met and traditional status imbalances are maintained, long-standing stereotypes that are largely based on status discrepancies are generally not revised (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). However, research indicates that when equal-status people from different racial and ethnic groups interact, such as soldiers in the U.S. Armed Forces, racial stereotyping and prejudices decline (Pettigrew, 1969).

“Only equals can be friends.”

—Ethiopian proverb

“You cannot judge another person until you have walked a mile in his moccasins.”

—American Indian proverb

Sustained Close Contact

The second condition is that the two groups must have *sustained close contact*. Several public-housing studies conducted in the 1940s and 1950s demonstrated the importance of this condition in reducing prejudice. Reflecting on these social experiments in racial integration, Stuart Cook stated:

One of the clearest findings of studies on the relation between intergroup contact and attitude change is that, while individuals rather quickly come to accept and even approve of association with members of another social group in situations of the type where they have experienced such association, this approval is not

contact hypothesis

The theory that under certain conditions, direct contact between antagonistic groups will reduce prejudice

likely to be generalized to other situations unless the individuals have quite close personal relationships with members of the other group. (Cook, 1964, pp. 41–42)

Similarly, survey studies and field experiments in France, Chile, Great Britain, Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands confirm that intergroup friendships significantly reduce both subtle and blatant explicit prejudice, as well as implicit prejudice (e.g., R. Brown et al., 2007; Gonzalez et al., 2010). The sustained close contact necessary to reduce prejudice does not even have to be something that one directly experiences; simply knowing that some of your ingroup members have outgroup friends is often sufficient to reduce prejudice toward that outgroup (Wright et al., 1997).

One likely reason school desegregation has not produced a significant reduction in racial prejudice is that students of different races generally avoid interacting with one another. That is, even though the school building is integrated, students segregate themselves on the bus and playground, and in the cafeteria and classroom. School officials often magnify the problem by separating students based on academic achievement, which results in advantaged white students and disadvantaged minority students having very little classroom contact (Epstein, 1985). One type of school activity that is fairly effective in reducing racial prejudice is team sports. When sports teams have a high percentage of minority athletes, there is a decrease in intergroup intolerance among the participants (Brown et al., 2003).


Intergroup Cooperation

A third necessary condition in reducing hostility is *intergroup cooperation*. As the Robbers Cave study demonstrated, animosity between the Rattlers and the Eagles subsided when they engaged in a joint activity to achieve mutually shared goals (*superordinate goals*). Similar results have been obtained in a variety of experimental and field settings, including school, work, and the armed forces (Desforges et al., 1997). One possible reason cooperation reduces intergroup bias and hostility is that cooperating members of different social groups appear to cognitively *recategorize* one another into a new ingroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2009).

Social Norms Favoring Equality

The fourth condition for successful conflict reduction is a social environment that contains *social norms favoring equality* (Monteith et al., 1996). As demonstrated in Chapter 5, social norms have a significant effect on determining people's behavioral intentions. Here is where authority figures and group leaders play a pivotal role. If they publicly state support for equality and actively oppose intolerance, others are likely to follow their lead (Bahns & Branscombe, 2011). If they oppose intergroup contact,

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Consider John Duckitt's dual-process model of personality-influenced prejudice (p. XXX.) Which of the two types of personality-influenced prejudice—prejudice based on the authoritarian personality or on social dominance orientation—is most likely to be positively influenced by sustained close contact with members of a group toward which a person holds prejudiced attitudes?

“And if a house be divided against itself, that house cannot stand.”

—Mark 3:24–25, The New Testament



When individuals from various ethnic groups join the armed services, situational conditions often reduce previously learned ethnic prejudices. In school settings, what type of activity is also likely to have these same situational conditions? (Wikimedia Commons)

“Let's go hand in hand, not one before another.”

—William Shakespeare, English dramatist and poet, 1564–1616

prejudice reduction is unlikely (Nesdale & Dalton, 2011). The lack of institutional tolerance of homosexuality was the principal reason that “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (instituted by Congress in 1993) led to increased discrimination against lesbians and gay men in the armed services—rather than reduced intolerance. At that time, many officers up the chain of command consistently expressed intolerance for enlisted homosexual personnel (Herek, 2003). By 2010, social attitudes had significantly changed and most of the top military leaders now supported repealing the policy, which President Obama did in December of that year. Now, with the support of the top military authorities, antigay prejudice in the military is likely to decrease.

Are All Four Conditions Necessary?

Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp (2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 713 separate studies that tested Allport’s contact hypothesis and its assumption that these four conditions are necessary for successful reductions in intergroup conflict. Their results indicated that intergroup contact does indeed have a substantial effect in reducing prejudice toward outgroups. However, while the greatest reductions in prejudice tended to occur when all four conditions in Allport’s model were present, significant reductions emerged even when some conditions were absent. Thus, counter to Allport’s initial thinking, while these four conditions do facilitate prejudice reduction, all four conditions are not necessary for reductions to occur.

Beyond the four conditions outlined in the original theory, Pettigrew (1998) has offered a reformulated version of the contact hypothesis in which he adds a fifth situational factor that facilitates prejudice reduction—namely, *friendship potential*. Pettigrew argued not only that developing friendships with outgroup members is important in precipitating the initial reduction in intergroup tensions, but also that fostering these emotional ties becomes increasingly important in reducing prejudice over time. Subsequent research has found that establishing a positive emotional relationship with even a single outgroup member can reduce both explicit and implicit prejudice toward the outgroup as a whole (Gulker & Monteith, 2013). Further, these cross-group friendships are most effective in reducing prejudice when individuals live in segregated neighborhoods and have had only occasional, or no, previous contact with outgroup members (Baum, 2010; Christ et al., 2010).

Beyond the Contact Hypothesis

One criticism of the contact hypothesis has been its overemphasis on changing the dominant group’s prejudicial attitudes, while ignoring the attitudes of minority group members (Devine et al., 1996). To more effectively promote intergroup harmony, social scientists must also consider (1) the attitudes and beliefs of minority group members, and (2) the beliefs and anxieties of everyone involved in intergroup contact. According to this perspective, during intergroup contact minority group members may feel anxious because they fear being victimized and negatively evaluated (refer back to the *stereotype threat* discussion, pp. 240–244), while dominant group members may be anxious from fear of saying or doing something that might be interpreted as a sign of prejudice (Shelton et al., 2005). Compounding this anxiety

is the concern of both parties that their interest in contact and interaction will not be reciprocated (Shelton & Richeson, 2005). This **intergroup anxiety** often creates difficulties in such social encounters, even in the absence of any real prejudicial attitudes (Ashburn-Nardo & Smith, 2008; Littleford et al., 2005). Among low-prejudiced individuals, those who

“Progress is a nice word, but change is its motivator. And change has its enemies.”

—Robert Kennedy, U.S. senator, 1925–1968

“Most of the bigoted remarks I have heard and prejudice I have experienced came from people who were trying to be popular, not despised.

They were following what they believed to be acceptable behavior in their group or sub-group, not deviating from it.”

—Clarence Page, U.S. author and social commentator, born 1947

intergroup anxiety

Anxiety due to anticipating negative consequences when interacting with an outgroup member

have had very limited contact with the outgroup are the ones most likely to experience intergroup anxiety (Blair et al., 2003; Brown et al., 2001).

When people experience this anxiety during intergroup exchanges, they often adopt a *protective self-presentation style*, in which they focus on trying not to make a bad impression, rather than trying to make a good one. Thus, they might talk less and generally act more cautiously than less anxious individuals. This strategy often backfires, however, because their outgroup partners tend to interpret their reticence as hostility (Plant & Butz, 2006). The good news is that if people place themselves in intergroup situations and do so with an open mind, their intergroup anxiety will likely decrease (Flynn, 2005; Phills et al., 2011).

In the final analysis, no single strategy eliminates prejudice and discrimination from the vocabulary of intergroup relations (Walsh, 2011). Because of the manner in which we as a species process information from our social world, and because of the importance we place on our group affiliations, we will always need to be attentive to the way we judge others. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with social stereotyping, it can easily diminish our ability to see the shared humanity in those who fall outside the favored category of “we.”



Intergroup anxiety can lead to awkward social situations, but such anxiety often disappears through repeated interactions. (Shutterstock)

Section Summary

- Stereotypical and prejudicial thinking can be reduced through self-regulation.
- The contact hypothesis identifies four conditions to reduce prejudice:
 - equal status interaction
 - intergroup cooperation
 - sustained close contact
 - social norms favoring equality
- A reformulated version of the contact hypothesis adds a fifth condition: friendship potential.
- Intergroup anxiety hinders the development of greater understanding between conflicted social groups.

APPLICATIONS

How Can Our Schools Be Positive Institutions of Social Change?

In 1971, Elliot Aronson was asked by the superintendent of the Austin, Texas, schools to devise a plan to reduce interracial tensions in the recently desegregated classrooms. After observing student interaction, Aronson realized that the social dynamics were strikingly similar to those described by Sherif in the Robbers Cave field study (refer back to pp. 248–250). Using that study and the contact hypothesis as guides, he and his colleagues developed a cooperative learning technique that came to be called the **jigsaw classroom** (Aronson et al., 1978; Aronson & Thibodeau, 1992). The technique was so named because students had to cooperate in “piecing together” their daily lessons, much the way a jigsaw puzzle is assembled. Ten fifth-grade classrooms were introduced to this technique, and three additional classes served as control groups.

In the jigsaw classroom, students were placed in six-person racially and academically mixed learning groups. The day’s lesson was divided into six subtopics, and each student was responsible for learning one piece of this lesson and then teaching it to the other group members. With the lesson divided up in this manner, cooperation was essential for success. In contrast to traditional classroom learning, in which students compete against one another, the jigsaw classroom promoted superordinate goals. It also promoted racial harmony. Compared with students in the control classrooms (in which traditional learning techniques were employed), students in the jigsaw groups showed a decrease in prejudice and an increase in liking for one another. This change in students’ attitudes toward one another was due to them recategorizing previous outgroup members as new ingroup members—“we” versus “us against them.” Their liking for school also improved, as did their level of self-esteem. The cooperative learning also improved minority students’ academic test scores, while white students’ scores remained the same. Since these studies were first conducted and reported, meta-analysis of results from similar cooperative classroom settings has found that the jigsaw method offers a promising way to improve race relations in desegregated schools by breaking down the “outgroup” barriers that drive a cognitive and emotional wedge between students (Miller & Davidson-Podgorny, 1987).

Another common social problem in academic settings is the failure of many minority students to perform up to their intellectual potential. For example, African American college students tend to underachieve academically—even when their college equivalency scores are equal to those of white students (Neisser et al., 1996). Based on our previous discussion of stereotype threat, this underachievement may be partly caused by two factors. First, the anxiety and extra cognitive burden associated with stereotype threat may directly impair black students’ academic achievement (Blascovich et al., 2001). Second, following repeated instances of this anxiety-induced underperformance, many students may disidentify with academic achievement so that it is no longer important to their self-esteem.

To counteract these two negative effects of stereotype threat, social psychologists have been instrumental in developing a new—and still evolving—educational approach, often referred to as “wise” schooling. An important component in wise schooling is to provide students with critical feedback concerning their academic progress in a manner that does not induce stereotype threat (Steele, 2010). Thus, instead of offering students stigmatizing

jigsaw classroom
A cooperative group-learning technique designed to reduce prejudice and raise self-esteem



How did social psychologist Elliot Aronson use the insights of the contact hypothesis in designing jigsaw classrooms to both foster cooperative learning and reduce prejudice? (Shutterstock)

remedial help—which often only reinforces doubts they may have about their intelligence and academic ability—wise schooling invites minority students to participate in a racially integrated and intellectually challenging learning program. Often working cooperatively, students receive the message that regardless of their current skill level, they have the ability to reach their academic potential. This message is another important component in wise schooling: Intelligence is not fixed and unchanging, but rather, through hard work, it is expandable (Aronson et al., 2002).

Beyond stereotype threat, one impediment to improving the academic performance of members of historically stigmatized groups is convincing them that critical feedback regarding their academic efforts is not motivated by prejudice (Steele et al., 2002). African American students who enter college with high expectations of race-based rejection are more likely to perceive themselves as targets of discrimination on campus (Mendoza-Denton et al., 2002). How do such perceptions of race-based bias affect these students' academic motivation? In one study investigating this question, black and white students at Stanford University were given the same critical feedback by a white evaluator about an essay they had written about their favorite teacher (Cohen et al., 1999). Compared with white students, black students saw the feedback from the white critic as more biased. Seeing it that way, the black students were less motivated to improve their essays for possible publication in a teaching journal than were the white students. These black students were talented writers, but their incorrect perception of racial prejudice caused them not to take the helpful feedback to heart.

If you consider the perspective of these students, how would you know whether criticism of your academic performance is based on prejudice? This is a question white students typically never have to ask. Is there any way over this academic hurdle? Perhaps. In this same study, researchers found that there was one form of academic feedback that bridged this racial divide: telling students that the academic activity they were engaged in had very high standards and that after evaluating their performance the instructor believed that the student could meet those standards with hard work. Receiving this form of feedback, black students perceived no bias and were highly motivated to improve their work. Apparently, this feedback conveyed to the black students that they were not being judged by negative stereotypes about their group's intellectual abilities.

Research on wise schooling programs among low-income, minority, and female students indicates that wise schooling fosters greater enjoyment of the academic process, greater identification with academic achievement and college-based careers, and higher grade point averages—compared with control groups who receive conventional schooling—among stigmatized groups who are most likely to experience stereotype threat (Good et al., 2003). In a very real sense, like stereotype threat, wise schooling is another example of the self-fulfilling prophecy. But instead of teachers expecting little from their minority students and ultimately having their expectations confirmed when those students fail and drop out of school, teachers in wise schooling programs begin with high expectations; and through that conviction, those expectations can also become reality.

THE BIG PICTURE

John Dovidio (2001) suggests that there have been three “waves” of scholarship in the study of prejudice. The first wave developed after World War II and conceived of prejudice as a form of personal psychopathology. The authoritarian personality is this wave’s most identifiable theory. The second wave began in the 1950s and approached prejudice as more of a social problem, much like a social cancer that spread from person to person. A number of theories developed from this social perspective, including realistic group conflict theory, the social contact hypothesis, and social identity theory.

This second wave, which peaked during the early 1990s, did not consider prejudice to be a manifestation of mental illness. Instead, it was conceptualized as an outgrowth of socialization, normal cognitive processes, and the natural desire to receive rewards and raise self-esteem. Now we are in the third wave of research on prejudice. Here, more attention is paid to understanding unconsciously held prejudicial attitudes, as well as how the targets of intergroup intolerance adapt to and cope with stigmatization. Examples of recent work in this third wave include implicit prejudice, stereotype threat, and ambivalent sexism. Together, these three research waves have deepened our understanding of how prejudice develops, spreads, and diminishes, as well as what consequences it has for both its targets and perpetrators.

We are far from being a nonprejudiced species. Our natural inclination to categorize people can set the stage for prejudice. It is also true that competition, ingroup loyalties, and social ideologies fan the flames of this tendency to see people as “them” rather than “us” (Lanning, 2002). However, as has been demonstrated throughout this text, our ability to reflect on our actions, our desire to act in ways consistent with our internalized personal beliefs, and our ability to reshape social reality all mean that prejudice can be reduced. If self-concept is truly a process of identification, what we need to do on an individual level is expand our ingroup identification to include humanity as a whole (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2009). In doing so, we will be able to see ourselves in those who were previously thought of as merely inferior “others.” This is by no means an insignificant cognitive shift. As you will discover in Chapter 10, when we include others in our self-concept, our resources become theirs to share and their successes and failures become our own. Therefore, the first step in achieving a community with a low level of prejudice is to monitor our own thinking and actions. The second step is to work collectively to change the perceptions of others. The question to ask yourself is whether you are ready to take that first step.

Key Terms

ambivalent sexism	232	outgroup	214
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Websites

Accessed Through <http://www.bvtlab.com/sop7>

Websites for this chapter focus on the nature of prejudice, including an analysis of ethnic stereotypes, sexual harassment, antigay prejudice, the history and psychology of hate crimes, and how to break prejudicial habits.

American Psychological Association

The American Psychological Association has webpages that explore a number of issues related to prejudice and discrimination. For example, one webpage analyzes whether all of us have some degree of prejudice, as well as the possibility that we can break our prejudicial habits. Another webpage explores the history of hate crimes, including their prevalence, perpetrators, and emotional effects.

American Association of University Women

This website for the American Association of University Women has separate pages devoted to sexual harassment (Hostile Hallways: The AAUW Survey on Sexual Harassment in America's Schools) and gender discrimination in education (Gender Gaps: Where Schools Still Fail Our Children).

Sexual Orientation: Science, Education, and Policy

This website features the work of Dr. Gregory Herek, a noted authority on antigay prejudice, and his Northern California Community Research Group. A number of the studies conducted by Herek and this group are cited in the present chapter.